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ABSTRACT

Litteral, Jacob A. M.Hum., Humanities Program, Wright State University, 2017. Is
Humanism to blame? Heidegger on Environmental Exploitation.

Humanism has been targeted as the source of environmental exploitation. With the aid of
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, this paper will attempt to answer the environmental
critique of humanism. It will be shown that humanism is not to blame for environmental
exploitation. This paper will also present Heidegger’s alternative to contemporary
environmentalism in addressing the issue of exploitation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lewis Hinchman has observed that, concerning the inquiry into the origin of the
Western exploitative mood, environmentalists have targeted humanism.1 According to
such environmentalists, the problems of our time, including environmental degradation,
climate change, resource depletion, overpopulation, and pollution, are all traced back to
humanism’s exploitative mood armed with technological devices.2 My thesis deals with
challenging that kind of environmentalism which charges humanism, and thereby
technology, as being responsible for our current environmental issues. Yet, my thesis also
ultimately shares with environmentalism such concerns over exploitation and its
rectification. With the aid of Martin Heidegger, I will challenge and present a better
alternative to that of the environmental critic.
The environmentalist project is guided by metaphor which is medical in form. For
instance, there are obvious symptoms showing that there is something wrong with our

1

Lewis P. Hinchamn, "Is Environmentalism a Humanism?" Environmental Values 13, no. 1
(2004): 3, url:
http://ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&
AN=PHL1779849&site=eds-live.
2
I recognize that there are various aims, ideas, strategies, values, etc., that fall under its broad
umbrella. My target is not a straw-man, but is aimed at certain voices and implicit ideas within the broad
umbrella.
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time and planet, showing it to be diseased. The etiological origin of the disease is traced
back firstly to something immaterial, and then something material. The immaterial causes
of the disease are ideas about man’s place in the universe, a world-view, which adversely
effects the environment in terms of exploitation. Humanism, it is claimed, is that
worldview in which the Western exploitative mood has its origin, which through time has
diseased our planet. The material cause are the actual technological devices employed by
human beings who are governed, whether explicitly or implicitly, by that humanistic
worldview. The prescribed cure and remedy for such a disease is likewise immaterial and
material.
For the immaterial side, with the aid of polemical debate, we combat and change
our worldview. In debate, we point out the flaws in holding such a view, showing its
inconsistency, untenability, and its unethical and harmful consequences. Polemical
debate, however, is most effective by appealing to sentiment: it is easier, for example, to
sway an opinion about factory farming by talking about, and showing pictures of, the
terrible living conditions of the poor, helpless animal in front of customers at the meat
counter at the local grocery. Secondly, we attempt to positively change our worldview by
(a) proffering a new, healthier way of regarding everything that is nonhuman (usually by
assigning rights and ascribing intrinsic value), and (b) by proffering a new, healthier way
of regarding humanity, usually by deflating human uniqueness, and getting one to see
that human beings are ‘just another’ animal or organism.

2

For the material issues, in our polemics we teach people the dangers of
technology for our individual lives and greater environment. Thus, we instill suspicion,
apprehension, and disdain for technology. From this there are many resulting practical
guidelines or programs for living and dealing with technology. For example, we could
just do away with technology completely, and return to a primitive, simple lifestyle in the
fashion of a Luddite or Neo-Luddite. We could actively sabotage technological devices
and property, employing guerilla-like tactics such as those of the Earth Liberation Front
(ELF). Or instead of being technophobic and rejecting technology outright, we could
reform our relationship to it, utilizing technological devices in a healthier and
ecologically responsible way.
Thus, the environmental critic takes on the form of a physician: identifying the
symptoms, diagnosing the disease, locating the causes of the disease, and providing the
cure for the disease. However, this medical perspective has unfortunate side effects.
Firstly, in diagnosing the disease, it renders the human being as a pathogen, as an
infectious agent. The pathogenic interpretation of the human being only makes sense if
man were some kind of alien invader bringing some incompatible substance from a
foreign home world with which to disrupt terrestrial-homeostasis. Secondly, it points
moral blame on the human being, in which certain inward and outward responses are
called upon in response. A kind of self-flagellation, guilt, and disapprobation for pride
species is encouraged inwardly, and active measures to level-off and deflate human
uniqueness in public discourse is encouraged outwardly.

3

Humanism, I argue, is not the origin for the Western exploitative mood. I agree
that we should offer a healthier way to regard humanity, yet it should not involve
pointing blame and deflation; we can still have a healthy ecosystem with human beings
regarding themselves as unique. Martin Heidegger’s work challenges such criticisms of
humanism, and can be seen as a form of humanism itself which actually aligns with the
environmentalist’s cause.
Heidegger does argue against humanism in his famous Letter on Humanism,
albeit a particular type of humanism, what I will refer to as ‘homocentrism.’ Heidegger
does not explicitly endorse or espouse humanism, nevertheless his work betrays a
commitment to the real substance of humanism: the preservation of human dignity, and
the preservation of humanism—understood in an academic sense as the humanities—
against the absorbing and totalizing power of the levelling discourses of science.
Furthermore, even though humanism proper is against any deflation tactics with regard to
humanity by seeking to keep human dignity and uniqueness in place, nevertheless it is
ultimately friendly towards, and is continuous with, the values and concerns shared by
the environmental critic. Heidegger’s work provides an alternative to the
environmentalist’s approach to the ills of our time, overall challenging their approach and
offering a better way of solving the problem all the while preserving humanism proper.

4

II.

HUMANISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT

It is uncontroversial at this point in history to say that human beings by and large
have impacted the environment in a variety of negative ways. At this precise moment of
typing these words, just in the year 2017 around 934,111 hectares have been deforested
worldwide, 2,155,430 hectares of the world’s fertile land have become arid, and around
1,758,902 tons of toxic chemicals have been released into the environment. Our energy
consumption has left us with only 150,015 days’ left worth of coal, and only 58,846
worth of natural gas.3 An entire paper could be dedicated to the effects of human activity
on the environment, but my aim is philosophical. Because environmental degradation
results most evidently by human activity, it is fitting to conduct a reassessment of what it
means to be human. Particularly, humanism will be under our investigation, as Lewis
Hinchman claims, in that “environmental theorists, seeking the origin of Western
exploitative attitudes toward nature, have directed their attacks against ‘humanism.’”4 In
this section, I will chart the “problem” of humanism: that humanism is the root of
environmental issues, and that humanism and environmentalism are at loggerheads with
each other. However, utilizing Hinchman’s insights, the case can be made for their unity,

3

“Worldometers – real time world statistics,” http://www.worldometers.info/.

4

Lewis, Environmentalism, 3.
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showing that humanism and environmentalism are compatible, and that ultimately
humanism proper is not to blame for the exploitative mood.
Environmental ethics itself was born out from inquiry concerning the moral
relationship between human beings and the environment. For early thinkers in this subdiscipline, the challenge was that of assessing how man regarded himself, and how he
regarded the environment which got us to our current environmental state. As Lynn
White, Jr. states, “what people do about their ecology depends on what they think about
themselves in relation to things around them.”5 Beginning with Artistotle, man was seen
as the center of value, as the sole-possessor of intrinsic worth. In De Anima, Aristotle
formulated a hierarchy of souls in which humans possessed an intellective soul, above the
lesser degrees of souls of animals, with a sensitive soul, and plants, with a vegetative
soul. In Aristotle’s Politics, he implies that this hierarchy is value-laden and not merely
descriptive:
In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their
sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and
food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the
provision of clothing and various instruments.6
Showing man’s place to be above animals and plants in a hierarchy, (1) a right was given
to man, and (2) an instrumental value was therefore ascribed over plants and animals.

5

Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Science Vol. 155, no. 3767
(1967): 1205, doi: 10.1126/science.155.3767.1203.
6

Artistotle, Politics, Book 1, Part VIII, url: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html.
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This gives rise to anthropocentricism and places the human being in the middle of the
universe in significance.
Some have argued that Christianity is the source of our environmental issues.
Maintaining that man had a God-given superiority over other forms of life, the right to
exploit became embedded in Western man’s mind, as indicated in Genesis 1:27-8 (KJV):
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male
and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing
that moveth upon the earth.
Likewise, in Peter’s Vision in the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament, Peter hears
the voice of God saying, “Rise, Peter; kill and eat,” after seeing a vision of a sheet
descend which contained “all manner of fourfooted beast of the earth, wild beasts, and
creeping things, and fowls of the air.”7 This implies that God himself gave a right to Peter
to eat, however clean or unclean, all animals. Consequently, all were alike in being
worthy of eaten, demonstrating the instrumental value that animals possess for sake of
man’s ends, one that is reckoned so from on high. In Lynn White, Jr.’s 1974 disputed
article, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” the claim is made that a psychic
revolution occurred with the “victory of Christianity over paganism,”8 a point in time in
which certain historical turning points (e.g., the Industrial Revolution) ultimately trace
their roots. The exploitative attitude within contemporary technology and science, the
7

Acts 10:11-13 (King James Version).

8

White, The Historical Roots, 1205.
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author claims, gains much of its traction with the developments of the Christian medieval
period.9
The change in the method of tillage is one indicator, according to White, that
societies began operating under a different psychic assumption concerning man’s place in
the environment than in previous times. For instance, White shows that in agricultural
societies of the Near East and Mediterranean, the scratch-plow method of tillage was
used such that the light soil allowed for it, it provided minimal interference with the soil,
and a single family with two oxen could sustain itself with just a relatively small,
squarish field. In this method of tillage, a cross-plow was therefore needed. However, by
the latter part of the 7th century, societies in the north of Europe began using a new kind
of plow, “equipped with a vertical knife to cut the line of the furrow, a horizontal share to
slice under the sod, and a moldboard to turn it over…It attacked the land with such
violence that cross-plowing was not needed, and fields tended to be shaped in long
strips.”10 This new method required double the oxen power, whereas previously the
amount of oxen power was proportionate to the consumption demands of a single family
unit for a single square field. Afterward “man’s relationship to the soil changed,” in
which land distribution was based “no longer on the needs of a family but, rather, on the
capacity of a power machine to till the earth.”11

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.

8

It was the advent of Judeo-Christian theology, White claims, that brought such a
shift in attitude from being part of nature, to being the exploiter of nature. Even today,
given our “post-Christian age,” White argues, “we continue to live, as we have lived for
about 1700 years, very largely in a context of Christian axioms.”12 Christianity had rethought and inverted the human-environment relationship into a competing dualism
between the two. Firstly, it provided a creation story, and with it, linear time. In an
orderly succession and with hierarchical significance, God created heaven and earth, light
and darkness, days and nights, land and water, plants and animals, and finally male and
female, who are the pinnacle of creation. Secondly, Western Church Fathers insisted that
“when God shaped Adam he was foreshadowing the image of the incarnate Christ, the
Second Adam. Man shares, in great measure, God’s transcendence of nature.”13 God is
other than his Creation, unlike pantheistic accounts of God, and he has dominion over his
creation. In the image of God, man likewise possesses this other than quality to that of
nature.
Thirdly, Christianity uprooted our animistic ways of dealing with nature, such that
natural objects previously had their own guardian spirits. Each violating instance between
man and nature was a harrowing event: we grieved and felt sympathetic to nature,
causing us to find a means to reconcile the enmity with the use of placation rituals.
Currently, the mood of indifference to natural objects reigns. Fourthly, the entire

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

9

discipline of Natural Theology—having initially an understanding of nature as a
“symbolic system through which God speaks to men: the ant is a sermon to sluggards;
rising flames are the symbol of the soul’s aspiration”14—has become less of a
communicative interaction between man and the environment, in which man would
attempt to decode God’s divine message speaking through the latter. Rather it became
more of “the effort to understand God’s mind by discovering how his creation
operates.”15 Instead of the rainbow being a symbol of hope, the rainbow became a source
for optical science, and consequently, a tool for technical superiority and domination.
Anthropocentrism might best be understood firstly as a descriptive claim about
man’s place in the universe, in terms of status and value compared to other kinds of
beings. However, anthropocentrism represents merely the justificatory inner idea behind
the prescriptive claim that humans should be preferred over and against other forms of
being. The idea of anthropocentrism as describing human significance, combined with
the prescriptive claim, I argue, produces the definition of humanism so targeted by
environmentalists. Humanism for them is not just a claim about our cosmic significance.
The Western cultural zeitgeist since the days of Plato and Aristotle for the environmental
critic has been informed by an entire Weltanschauung, or worldview, revolving solely
around human supremacy, pervading every area of human life, informing our attitudes
and behavior.

14

Ibid., 1206.

15

Ibid.

10

How we get to the notion that human beings are in fact at the center of things may
vary, whether it be that we had received it via a divine dictate from a deity, or through
rigorous philosophical reflection. Nevertheless, the cash-value of such a self-perception
or belief often yields certain ways of acting and engaging in the world. On a theoretical
level, anthropocentrism does not necessarily justify exploitation; the belief could simply
rest inside of our skulls without having it be put to action towards a larger, exploitative
program. David Hume’s famous discussion detailing how one cannot derive an ‘ought’
from an ‘is’ suggests that, however matter-of-fact it may be that humans are at the center
of things, prescriptive or ethical inferences from that claim cannot be justified. As a side
note, human action does not need true justifications to proceed with an activity, but just
enough perceived as true justification. Your mind only needs an efficacious amount of
cognitive permission, or a good enough rational argument, with which to carry out a
behavior that the ‘gut’ initially determined was worth pursuing. Additionally, and
pragmatically speaking, beliefs, regardless of their truth, tend to be rules for action.
Therefore, it is no wonder that such a large scale, cosmically significant belief concerning
our place and significance in the universe would inevitably produce some degree of an
exploitative attitude.
Humanism, defined as a descriptive claim concerning the status of the human
being affixed with a prescriptive claim that human beings should be preferred and take
precedence in all manner of things, is regarded by many environmentalists as the main
contributor for environmental issues. However, against the broad preference for

11

humanity, certain sub-targets are also levelled against, principal among them being
reason and rationality. The biologist David Ehrenfield in his 1978 book titled The
Arrogance of Humanism claims that humanism is a religion, one powered by “a supreme
faith in human reason—its ability to confront and solve the many problems that humans
face, its ability to rearrange both the world of Nature and the affairs of men and women
so that life will prosper.”16 For Ehrenfield and many others, humanism stands for a
religion of human greatness. This greatness is shown in our liberation from the
oppressive stronghold of God and Church through the utilization of our own inborn
rational capacities. After liberation from oppression, a reinvestigation of where we should
derive our authority and foundations for culture inevitably led to the development of
autonomy, an idea most attributed to Kant. Aided by reason, human beings should
therefore free themselves to think for themselves, to find within their own rational
capacities an authority and foundation to inform their lives and their surrounding society.
It is a ‘self-incurred’ tutelage, Kant explains, “when its cause lies not in lack of
understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without
another's guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere aude.).”17 Kant encourages humans to think
for themselves18, to wrestle free from their self-incurred tutelage, and not to fall back into

16

David W. Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (Oxford; Toronto: Oxford University Press,

1981), 5.
Immanuel Kant, “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment,” url:
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html.
17

18

Ibid.

12

the mass of “domestic cattle” who have been unfaithfully stewarded and steered never to
question established dogma and truth. However, an unfortunate side-effect emerges from
our self-emancipation from the religious or mythical view of the world: disenchantment.
Paul Jeffrey Lindholt, in an article published in The Trumpeter Journal of
Ecosophy, provides another sub-target for criticism in his statement that “when
intellectuals embraced humanism, many of them banished nature as a site of inspiration
and wonder…[because] By and large it is not considered rational, and hence it is not
humanistic, to regard contemplation of the natural world as a route to human
improvement.”19 Nature disenchanted, nature drained of its ennobling capacities is often
associated with humanism. Humans are no longer beckoned by nature to regard her as
having contemplative worth. Incidentally, Max Weber was the first to explicitly articulate
such a sentiment. Weber showed that, along with disenchantment, the world became
regarded as a “causal mechanism”, produced by “rational, empirical knowledge”.20
Furthermore, by the means of science and technology, rationality entailed,
…the knowledge or belief that, if only one wanted to, one could find out at any
time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces
19

Paul Jeffrey Lindholdt, "Antidotes to Humanism," Trumpeter: Journal Of Ecosophy 28, no. 1
(2012): 112, url:
http://ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&
AN=90565479&site=eds-live.
Max Weber, “Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions,” in H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1948),
quoted in Patrick Sherry, “Disenchantment, Re-Enchantment, and Enchantment” Modern Theology 25, no.
3 (2009): 370, url:
http://ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&
AN=PHL2137774&site=eds-live.
20
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that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted.21
Nature became regarded as just dull, meaningless stuff to which the rational mind can
work over to produce knowledge for mastery, which thus affects the vocation of science.
As Patrick Sherry interprets Weber, this way of regarding the natural world affects the
motives of scientists in such a way that:
Most scientists today, says Weber, are not concerned with learning through
science about the meaning of the world, or with answering Tolstoy’s question
“What should we do? How should we live?”22
Nevertheless, nature abhors a vacuum. From the development of intellectualism and
rationalism, modern industrial capitalism and bureaucracy emerge to rule over our public
lives, leaving us to carve out private lives which function as safe-spaces of resistance. A
paradigm of loss of connection, a sense an estrangement and dualism between man and
environment, and the resulting fragmentation of our social lives into public and private
spheres now reigns.
Notwithstanding the insights of some of these criticisms, environmental critics are
mistaken in their attempt to render humanism guilty and responsible for the Western
exploitative attitude. On a superficial level, what is objectionable are the definitional
leaps and assumptions made by environmentalists: oftentimes anthropocentrism and
humanism are used interchangeably, resulting in an oversimplification and

Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), url: http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Science-as-a-Vocation.pdf.
21

22

Sherry, Disenchantment, Re-enchantment, and Enchantment, 371.

14

misrepresentation of the latter. ‘Homocentrism’ might be a better word for the sense in
which they are using the term, a word Hinchman defines as “the conviction that human
interests should always take precedence over the interests of other species.”23 The way
environmentalists define humanism is nothing but a sloppy misuse of the term and a
straw-man. By providing a definition of the way they are using the term humanism (now
as homocentrism) that keeps the descriptive and prescriptive elements distinct, I hinted
toward retaining the word ‘humanism’ from its being understood mainly in the context of
anthropocentrism. In doing so I hope to render humanism free and clear of the charges
levelled against it by environmental critics. The real charge is against homocentrism, not
humanism; the two must be kept distinct. Humanism proper, as will be laid out by
Hinchman, is a much broader term with historical significance, and some of the ideas
within are beneficial to environmentalism.
Hinchman provides a noteworthy argument concerning the misrepresentation of
humanism by environmental critics. Additionally, Hinchman provides an argument that
bridges the gap between humanism and environmentalism. He aims at reconciling the
two by first drawing humanism away from its tendency to treat nature and freedom as
metaphysical polarities, and then by drawing environmentalism away from its flirtation
with deterministic, biologistic worldviews. To draw humanism away from its flawed,
polarizing metaphysical tendency, it is best to get down to brass tacks: what exactly does
humanism mean on its own terms. But first, Hinchman briefly outlines the standard

23

Lewis, Environmentalism, 5.
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critiques levelled against humanism. One standard critique is the simple one provided
above, as being against the notion that human interests should take precedence. However,
Hinchman observes that there is a deeper, more complex critique “implicit in many of the
best essays in environmental theory, one that can be reconstructed as a historical
narrative.”24
This narrative depicts a primordial age, a type of Garden of Eden, in which
humans dwelled peacefully with the land, respectful of the guardian spirits and not puffed
up with feelings of their own self-worth over and against their environment. Humans felt
embedded with nature, so they claim, and felt a kinship with land, animals, and divinities.
But at some point, things changed for Western Civilization. “Philosophers began to exalt
human beings above the rest of nature, depicting mind as both a separate substance and as
the repository of a higher, truer reality.”25 A narrative “fall from grace” points the blame
at the philosopher’s meddling, an act which instigated a dualism between man and nature,
ultimately leading to representationalist accounts of knowledge that imposed upon nature
“a grid of concepts and mathematical relationships—sometimes called ‘Galilean
nature’—designed to promote human interests, especially those amenable to scientific
and technological control.”26 Hinchman does however acknowledge that there are
sophisticated environmentalists who do recognize that humanism is a complex, ‘tapestry

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.
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of ideas,’ and is not to be oversimplified. Nevertheless, the narrative of a ‘fall’ and its
causes seem to crop up again and again in their writings which misrepresents humanism,
all the while “influencing us to draw political and ideological lines in the wrong
places.”27
Environmentalists critics tend to downplay the historical significance of
humanism as an explicit tradition by named individuals, and instead focus their attention
on its worldview influence on attitude and behavior. In doing so, they misrepresent and
attack a straw-man. As Hinchman explains, humanism has:
…a history traceable to and embodied in the writings of certain philosophers and
creative artists. To disconnect philosophical terms from their historical context is
to invite misunderstanding and arbitrariness, as well as to lose a sense of the depth
and resonance they evoke. Would it be intellectually responsible to talk about
liberalism without examining the texts of, say, Lock, Mill, Isaiah Berlin and John
Rawls? Besides, the convictions that inform everyday life usually turn out to be
less rigorous versions of doctrines that have been articulated in formal treatises
and essays.28
However, some may grant that there is an historically traceable humanist tradition
embodied in people and books, but that these have nothing in common with
contemporary humanism. As Ehrenfield observes, historically traceable definitions of
humanism are obsolete, in that contemporary humanists do not typically define
themselves as having a passion for reviving classical Greek and Latin texts.29 Humanists

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid., 6.

29

Ehrenfield, Arrogance, 6-7.
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today likewise do not share with their Renaissance counterparts a passion to provide
better translations of the Bible. Similarly, humanism no longer means “the pursuit of the
humanities,” meaning that a “poet, a professor of comparative literature, and a sculptor
are not automatically humanists.”30 Ehrenfield finally argues that we “cannot allow the
definition of humanism to become totally amorphous,”31 for throughout history the
humanist label has been slapped on a vast variety of people and movements. Therefore,
he opts for isolating humanism’s definitional content to those mentioned above, which
has its place in contemporary versions of humanism.
Even though there is a disconnect between contemporary and Renaissance
humanism’s self-conception, Hinchman believes that this does not therefore mean that we
should opt for the simpler, easier definition of humanism embodied most evidently in
contemporary versions. He believes that “it may be possible to uncover continuities and
unexpected connections between humanism past and present if we reflect on why the
literati of earlier centuries were preoccupied with such matters.”32 What were those
preoccupations for early humanists? As protest to scholasticism, Renaissance humanists
endeavored to find “some more direct access to the world than through arid syllogisms
and priestly pronouncements.”33 By accessing classical languages and studying the works

30

Ibid., 7.

31

Ibid.

32

Hinchman, Environmentalism, 7.

33

Ibid.
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of the great ancient philosophers, a new fascinating world opened up, one that “seemed
far more civilized, urbane, and cultivated than anything the Middle Ages had to offer.”34
In other words, Renaissance humanists attempted to “mark off an intellectual space free
of the categories and preoccupations of the Christian Church.”35 Renaissance humanism
then valued the ‘all-sided-man’ of learning and skill acquisition, giving rise to men like
Leon Battista Alberti. Alberti was gifted in many areas including gymnastics, music,
civic and canonical law, physics, mathematics, painting, architecture, and literature, to
name a few.36 Alberti was the paradigmatic humanist of the day, one who exclaimed bon
mot: “Men can do all things if they will.”
Yet, an environmental critic may immediately see such phrase as justifying their
pronouncement that Western man’s arrogance gives rise to exploitation. However, this is
not the case. Alberti’s engagement with the world “does not strike the reader as arrogant
and manipulative, but rather as overflowing with the delight of mind and senses in a
world too long dismissed as a vale of tears.”37 Whereas in the middle ages the world was
a sinful, depraved place, only to be destroyed at the end of the world, the world for
people like Alberti became precisely that enchanting place that was said to be lost due to
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the advent of human supremacy. As Jacob Burckhardt observes, Alberti was far from an
arrogant, nature exploiter:
But the deepest spring of his nature has yet to be spoken of—the sympathetic
intensity with which he entered into the whole life around him. At the sight of
noble trees and waving cornfields he shed tears; handsome and dignified old men
he honored as ’a delight of nature,’ and could never look at them enough.
Perfectly formed animals won his goodwill as being specially favored by nature;
and more than once, when he was ill, the sight of a beautiful landscape cured
him.38
To the contrary, having been revivified by means of learning and cultivation, Alberti
viewed nature precisely as that magical, enchanting place which may be in consort with
sentiments shared by environmental critics themselves.
Another aspect of humanism’s past that is downplayed is its civic emphasis,
which Hinchman claims appeared to favor “neither a leviathan state nor technocratic
problem-solving approaches; instead it gives sustenance to those environmentalists who
imagine small-scale, local Jeffersonian communities of equal citizens in face-to-face
conversations about their common affairs.”39 Republicanism in Rome and democracy in
Athens would have undoubtedly been encountered in humanism’s attempt to revive the
heritage of classical antiquity. Such a revival would have presented a world of citizens
expressing confidence in self-rule and cooperative interaction for the sake of societal
well-being.
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A historical resurgence of Renaissance humanism in the latter part of the 18th
century also indicated a much different self-conception than the demonized homocentric
version of humanism. Also known as the Goethezeit, this period was marked by two
impulses: the philosophical influence of Kant, and the reactionary movement of
Romanticism which attempted to overcome the dualisms of Kant’s Critiques. Kant
provided some of the decried features of humanism with his dualisms, “especially the
notion of human freedom set off against ‘deed’, mechanical causation,
representationalism (albeit with a transcendental twist) on the conception of autonomy as
a struggle to overcome nature.”40 However, Hinchman claims that there were good
reasons for these dualisms. Their benefit lies in the attempt to preserve ethics from the
“associationist psychology and proto-utilitarianism of Hume.”41 Preserving ethics from
Hume would help create a “theoretical space” in which insights could be articulated
without fitting them into the “straightjacket of Galilean physics and associated empiricist
philosophies.”42 The resulting single, universal categorical imperative was countered by
Romantic writers as promoting a kind of monoculture which prevented cultural formation
in terms of letting each culture flourish on its own terms. Notice that both impulses of
this period, it can be argued, have as their goal that which environmentalist can agree on:
Kant sought a theoretical safe-space against oppression of a rational Galilean physics,
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and Romantic writers sought a more pluralistic type of Bildung that resists an abstract
monoculture being applied to all cultures at all times in an arid uniformity.
Humanism at present still retains these themes, while also adding others that
“confront more directly the erosion of humanity at the hands of bureaucratic,
technologically advanced, consumer societies.”43 Humanism past and present eventually
veered away from a trail that would lead into rationalism and mathematically based
physical sciences, and pursued an entirely different course “that would lead via Vico and
Herder to Dilthey’s conception of the humanities as methodologically distinctive.”44 In
other words, humanism would give rise to a whole new area of scholarly concern dealing
with human culture and activity as methodologically distinct from the those of the
sciences, attempting to assign to each discipline their own incommensurable way of
discoursing. Among such influential thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, and Martin Heidegger, efforts were made to ward off “the assimilation of the
humanities by natural sciences, to warn against the dystopias of technocratic reason, and
to articulate the distinctive approaches and contents that set the human sciences apart.”45
However, as Hinchman observes, Heidegger would inevitably reject the term
humanism as characterizing his own way of thinking. Even though Heidegger offers a
well-known critique of humanism, his thinking is aligned with humanism as outlined by
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Hinchman. Heidegger’s critique operates with the sense of humanism as homocentrism
shown above, in which he treats humanism in the context of anthropocentrism.
Furthermore, Heidegger’s thinking exemplifies this marriage of humanism and
environmentalism that Hinchman so carefully demonstrates. In the next section I will
show Heidegger’s critique of humanism. Why? As a way of reformulating what it means
to be human and the word ‘humanism’ so that we can deflect the charges levelled by the
environmentalist. Heidegger’s critique does not render him an anti-humanist, rather it
shows him to be more aligned with humanism properly understood by Hinchman.
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III.

HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM

Heidegger’s critique of humanism will be presented from two angles: (i) from
ideas pulled from his earlier work, Being and Time, and (ii) from his explicit argument
against a homogenized version of humanism presented in his “Letter on ‘Humanism.’”
Heidegger’s critique is ultimately against homocentrism, and not humanism proper.
i.
Hans Ruin notes that Being and Time is “animated by a sense of crisis. From its
inception, the question which it seeks to answer has already been lost, and is in need of
being reawakened.”46 This crisis was the meaning of Being. The meaning of Being is
lost, forgotten, and its content vacuous, empty, and evanescent.47 Being’s meaning is of
primordial importance for Heidegger, in that “everything we talk about, mean, and are
related to is in being one way or another.”48 Only until the question of Being has
beensufficiently addressed can one even tackle such disciplines as ethics, religion, and
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even humanism itself. “Without such an opening up of Being, we could not be “human”
in thefirst place.”49 Heidegger’s inquiry into Being resultantly redefines the human being
in such a way that would drain the conceit of the anthropocentric self-image.
Pursuing the question of Being is difficult. Our conceptual schemes do not
conform to Being for the very reason that Being is not an entity, it is not an “it.”50
Metaphysical thinking will have to be challenged and set aside if we are to come back to
the meaning of Being. Heidegger spells out the issue with thinking metaphysically about
Being:
As what is asked about, being thus requires its own kind of demonstration which
is essentially different from the discovery of beings. Hence what is to be
ascertained, the meaning of being, will require its own conceptualization, which
again is essentially distinct from the concepts in which beings receive their
determination of meaning.51
If Being is not an entity which can be grasped by means of metaphysical thinking, and
must be exhibited in a way of its own, then there is a split: there are beings (conceptual,
extant, individuated entities), and Being itself. Being and beings are split such that to
each is accorded a different mode of conceiving: beings are conceived in determinate
ways via signs, and Being is conceived in a different manner. Heidegger calls this the
“ontological difference” (die ontologische Differenz), a crucial point in which Being (das
Sein) and beings (das Seiendes) are kept distinct. Heidegger’s claim is that “’Being’ is
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not something like a being,”52 but Being is that “which determines beings as beings, that
in terms of which beings have always been understood no matter how they are
discussed.”53 This other way of conceiving Being might be regarded as pre-conceptual, in
that it is what determines something becoming intelligible as something. Heidegger
expresses his concern for the necessity of clarifying the meaning of Being:
The question of being thus aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only
of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type and are thereby
already involved in an understanding of being; but it aims also at the condition of
the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them.
All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at
its disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it
has not previously clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this
clarification as its fundamental task.54
The way of conceiving the meaning of Being is very difficult, however, and Heidegger’s
work is the attempt to think of Being through other “conceptual” means. Being and Time
is Heidegger’s attempt at such another way of thinking about Being, known as
fundamental ontology.
To commence fundamental ontology, an ‘access-point’ for inquiry is required. By
interrogating one particular type of being, namely, the human being, Heidegger thought
he could ascertain the a priori conditions for the possibility for something to ‘show up’ at
all, how beings are disclosed as intelligible and meaningfully relevant to human beings.
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Why interrogate the human being? Because humans have a special distinctiveness,55 such
that they are “ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned
about its very being.”56 Further, human beings have a privileged access to being, albeit in
a pre-conceptual way. Michael Inwood notes that human beings possess a three-tiered
implicit, pre-conceptual understanding of being, in which (1) humans engage with
entities “ontically, acquiring ontical knowledge about them,” (2) only insofar as humans
have a pre-ontological (vorontologisch) understanding of Being in the first place, and (3)
as a philosopher, a human can attain at least concepts about Being.57 An interrogation of
the human being, therefore, is that access-point for retrieving the meaning of Being.
In part one of Being and Time, Heidegger sets to task the elaboration of the
question of the meaning of Being through “a special interpretation of a particular being”58
mentioned above. That being is the human being, what Heidegger now calls Dasein, a
word composed of the German Da (there) and Sein (being): literally ‘being-there’.
Heidegger opts for describing human being in this way to subvert traditional ontological
labeling using criteria of ‘whatness,’ which ascribes “a case and instance of a genus of
beings as objectively present.”59 Heidegger wants to move away from this kind of
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labelling for the very reason that objectively present things are indifferent to their own
being. Too see its importance, recall that Heidegger is interested primarily in inquiring
into Being, and the access-point to inquiry is that of the human being, a being for whom
its own being is an issue for it. Dasein cares about its own being and its own ways of
existing as a temporal-historical being. Dasein, unlike other beings, is its own being
(Jemeinigkeit), and it is its own being “to be always in this or that way.”60 Dasein’s
“essence” if you will, is not a ‘what’ but a ‘way,’ namely existence.61 The characteristics
of Dasein are not objectively present (Vorhandenheit), that which have “such and such an
‘outward appearance,’ but rather possible ways for it to be, and only this.” Think of the
being of Dasein as a verb, be-ing, as ways for it to be in its historical unfolding. The
priority of existence and the ‘always-being-mine’ of Dasein yields an interpretation
which Heidegger claims provides the confrontation “with a unique phenomenal region.”62
Dasein is a being that “always defines itself in terms of a possibility which it is
and somehow understands in its being.”63 However, Dasein does not confront the
possible ways for it to be in a thematic or theoretic way, but these ways are uncovered
through analysis revealing that Dasein was initially ‘indifferent’ to them. Notice I stated
earlier that Dasein is that being for whom its own being is an issue, whose being is
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‘always-being-mine,’ and for whom possible ways of existing is of chief concern. How
can Dasein be ‘indifferent’ then to those terms of its own possibility? Heidegger explains:
At the beginning of the analysis, Dasein is precisely not to be interpreted in the
differentiation of a particular existence; rather, it is to be uncovered in the
indifferent way in which it is initially and for the most part. This indifference of
the everydayness of Dasein is not nothing; but rather, a positive phenomenal
characteristic. All existing is how it is out of this kind of being, and back into it.
We call this everyday indifference of Dasein averageness.64
Average everyday ways of interacting in the world is what constitutes Dasein’s “ontic
immediacy.”65 This indifference can be demonstrated in a practical way, as for example,
when I turn the door knob to walk into my apartment, the door knob is itself passed over
in importance; the door knob does not ‘show up’ in any strikingly salient way, but blends
in as a mere part of the activity of entering my apartment. Interestingly, my indifference
to the door knob does not constitute the object as a vague, indeterminate something.
Rather, it shows the door knob to be pregnant with significance as part of an overarching
goal-structure, albeit one that I grasp in a behavioral know-how.
Far from dealing with the door knob in a thematic, conceptual way as a ‘material
object,’ instead I deal with it like I would a familiar piece of furniture. If you were to ask
me, “what is that thing you grasped?” I would say, “a door knob,” and not “a material
object.” J.L. Austin famously terms these kinds of objects as “moderate-sized specimens
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of dry goods,”66 in which objects are familiar to us. They are familiar in the sense that
they are proportionate to the human form and to human activity, such that they are “near”
to us yet inconspicuous. Heidegger terms this way of encountering beings in the world as
ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), a primordial way of associating in the world “with innerworldly beings”.67 Our associations “are already dispersed in manifold ways of taking
care of things.”68 The closest and nearest associations with things in the world are prethematic; they show up in activities of handling, using, manipulating, and taking care of
things. In Heidegger’s analytic, these indifferent associations and structures are the
primary targets for interrogation because in them we can get closer to the meaning of
Being. They form the existentials that characterize Dasein’s average everydayness.
Having profiled Dasein’s condition of caring about its own possible ways of
being, and the existentials of Dasein’s average everydayness that yield a ‘unique
phenomenal region’ for interrogation, Heidegger shows that these all must be “seen and
understood a priori as grounded upon that constitution of being which we call being-inthe-world.”69 This constitution of being-in-the-world forms the underlying basis for all
structural determinations and modes of Dasein’s existence. It is a “unified phenomena,”
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in that it must be taken as a whole even though it contains “several constitutive structural
factors.”70 ‘Being-in’ does not imply a spatial relation, as of water being ‘in’ the glass.
Rather, being-in designates “a constitution of being of Dasein, and is an existential.”71
Heidegger’s use of being-in is understood through an etymology of “in,” which has its
origin in innan-, a word that means to live, particularly to dwell. The ‘an’ of the word
innan suggests a kind dwelling that is not just factual dwelling in the spatial sense of
living in a house, a geographic region, or the world generally, but is a kind of dwelling in
the familiar sense, in which one has familiar associations of taking care of things. It
means “to dwell near…, to be familiar with…”72 Being-in is a familiarity in relation to
the second part of Dasein’s fundamental constitution, ‘the-world’. Dasein’s relationship
with the world can be defined “in the sense of being absorbed in the world.”73 To be
absorbed suggests a ‘being-with’ and not a “being next to each other,”74 or a coming
‘face-to-face’ to each other in terms of objective presence. This constitutional structure of
Dasein as being-in-the-world must be distinguished from Dasein’s facticity, which are the
factual ways “in which Dasein actually is.”75
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Heidegger regards the ‘being-in’ of being-in-the-world to be the “formal
existential expression of the being of Da-sein,” which has “the essential constitution of
being-in-the-world.”76 The formal expression is made manifest in various ways.
Heidegger gives the examples: “to have to do with something, to produce, order and take
care of something, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to undertake,
to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak about, to determine.”77
These suggest a fundamental character of taking care of… This fundamental constitution
has profound implications for what it means to ‘know’ something, and hence upending
subsequent links underpinning humanism.
Knowing is a mode of being for Dasein, and it is just one of many kinds of ways
of being-in-the-world. It is grounded beforehand in being-in-the-world, a being-alreadyabsorbed-with-the-world and dealing with things in numerous ways. Dasein is firstly
“taken in by the world which it takes care of,”78 in which Dasein goes about its everyday
activities mostly hitch-free. It is only until there is a deficiency in Dasein’s absorbed
dealings with things that the possibility for ‘knowing’ in the traditional, Cartesian sense
can occur. For example, when I am engaged in digging a hole, I am absorbed in the
digging such that I am performing a task requiring more sensorimotor functioning than
abstract, thematic reasoning; the bulk of my awareness is on performing the task at hand.
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However, if my shovel breaks, then there is a breakup in the momentum of my
concernful dealing with the task of digging. Heidegger claims that it is at this very
moment that my mode being-in switches to the only available leftover of “lingering
with…”79 To linger-with is to stop what one is doing in order to look at the thing that is
stripped of everyday significance, in order to ‘see’ it as something objectively present.
Heidegger explains:
On the basis of this kind of being toward the world which lets us encounter beings
within the world solely in their mere outward appearance (eidos), and as a mode
of this kind of being, looking explicitly at something thus encountered is possible.
This looking at is always a way of assuming a definite direction toward
something, a glimpse of what is objectively present. It takes over a "perspective"
from the beings thus encountered from the very beginning. This looking itself
becomes a mode of independent dwelling together with being in the world.80
Knowing in the Cartesian sense is possible for Dasein, but only derivatively possible.
When Dasein lingers-with something after a deficiency in its concernful dealings, a
perception of the that something can take place. By perception is meant “addressing and
discussing something as something,”81 in which a perception becomes a definition.
Having its expression in propositional form, the definition can be maintained and reified.
Heidegger calls this the “perceptive retention of a proposition,”82 which is mistakenly
interpreted in Cartesianism to be the procedure whereby “a subject gathers representation
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about something for itself which then remain stored up “inside” as thus appropriated.”83
From this mistaken interpretation numerous interminable problematics arise out from the
question as to how these representations correspond with reality.
Rather, the perceptive retention of a proposition is itself just another way of
being-in-the-world, another type of caring. Dasein’s knowing is not an event of going
“outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated,”84 in order to get that
thing outside to bring it back inside. Rather, it can be said that Dasein is already, initially
“outside,” together with some being already discovered:
Again, the perception of what is known does not take place as a return with one’s
booty to the “cabinet” of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it.
Rather, in perceiving, preserving, and retaining, the Da-sein that knows remains
outside as Da-sein.85
The use of the term ‘outside’ is a play on the ‘insideness’ of the Cartesian knowing
subject located somewhere inside the corporeal body; this is another crafty inversion
scheme by Heidegger to subvert the tradition. Dasein’s being as already-being-outside
reveals that Dasein’s knowing yields a “new perspective of being toward the world
already discovered by Da-sein,”86 and can be developed as a guide for Dasein’s being-inthe-world. However, as Heidegger concludes, “knowing neither first creates a
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“commercium” of the subject with the world, nor does this commercium originate from
an effect of the world on a subject. Knowing is a mode of Da-sein which is founded in
being-in-the-world.”87
In what manner is Being and Time against humanism? Heidegger provides
another definition of what it means to be human against what may be considered the most
influential view embedded within the modern tradition: Cartesian subjectivism.
Descartes’ philosophical project of finding a sure foundation for knowledge led him to
postulate the ego cogito subject, an immaterial substance which confronts a material
world by means of a representative apparatus. The subject was emancipatory; a
weaponized philosophical postulate against the epistemic authority of God and Church.
As Heidegger explains in “The Age of the World Picture”:
For up to Descartes…the being, insofar as it is a particular being, a particular subiectum (hypo-keimenon) is something lying before from out of itself, which, as
such, simultaneously lies at the foundation of its own fixed qualities and changing
circumstances. The superiority of a sub-iectum (as a ground lying at the
foundation) that is preeminent because it is in an essential respect unconditional
arises out of the claim of man to a fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis
(self-supported, unshakable foundation of truth, in the sense of certainty). Why
and how does this claim acquire its decisive authority? The claim originates in
that emancipation of man in which he frees himself from obligation to Christian
revelational truth and Church doctrine to a legislating for himself that takes its
stand upon itself.88
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The subject was now to be regarded as the epistemic center of priority. However, as
Heidegger argues, subjectivism leads to anthropology, and consequently, to humanism.
Heidegger in “The Age of the World Picture” claims that two events shaped the
modern age, such that (a) the world became fundamentally regarded as a ‘picture’ (Bild)
which is (b) at the subiectum’s disposal as a thing to be manipulated and conquered.89
The more extensively man regards the world as picture, the more the subiectum grows in
significance. In the picture, beings are indexed and assigned a proper place, indeed man
himself is placed: as the maker and confronter of the picture, in which man “empowers
himself as lord of the earth.”90 Resultantly, the world changes into “a doctrine of man,
into anthropology.”91 Seeing as though the world is increasingly seen as a picture for a
subject, the world becomes increasingly understood via human lenses. From
anthropology, Heidegger claims that “it is no wonder that humanism first arises where the
world becomes picture.”92 Heidegger continues:
It would have been just as impossible for a humanism to have gained currency in
the great age of the Greeks as il would have been impossible to have had anything
like a world picture in that age. Humanism, therefore, in the more strict
historiographical sense, is nothing but a moral-aesthetic anthropology. The name
"anthropology" as used here does not mean just some investigation of man by a
natural science. Nor does it mean the doctrine established within Christian
theology of man created, fallen, and redeemed. It designates that philosophical
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interpretation of man which explains and evaluates whatever is, in its entirety,
from the standpoint of man and in relation to man.93
Anthropology arises with the commencement of subjectivism, from treating the world as
picture. Consequently, this leads to the “fundamental event of modernity” as the
“conquest of the world as picture.”94 Anthropology leads into humanism, providing a link
between Cartesianism and humanism.
It must be pointed out that Heidegger’s use of the term humanism is associated
with anthropology, a usage Joanna Hodge finds unusual. She says it is unusual because
Heidegger’s use of humanism “does not address what is usually meant by the term.”95
Rather, Heidegger’s use of humanism arises from the “connection between theories
assigning value to what it is to be human, given in humanism, and the epistemological
and metaphysical roles assigned to theories of the subject.”96 Anthropology picks out the
connection between the two. What is usually meant by humanism is debatable, as I
believe the term cannot be isolated to a singular doctrine, but rather is the tapestry of
ideas as laid out by Hinchman. What is usually meant by the word humanism is not
provided by Hodge, but I surmise she means the garden variety version of humanism in
the sense of freedom and autonomy, the freedom from tradition and the freedom for a
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self-grounding authority. This contemporary view sees humanism as the liberator of
ancient philosophy from Christian Theology, a view Heidegger rejects:
Ancient philosophy was pressed by Christian dogmatism into a very definite
conception, which persisted through the Renaissance, humanism and German
idealism and whose untruth we are only today beginning slowly to comprehend.
Perhaps the first to realize it was Nietzsche.97
Far from being the liberator, humanism itself still retains Christian theological residues. It
is no wonder that Cartesian subjectivity looks a lot like a modern ‘soul theory’. I will
proceed on the humanism-anthropology assumption, and hence the Cartesianismhumanism connection. I am not alone in making this connection. For instance, Erica
Fudge observes that Descartes is “the poster-boy for current representations of humanist
ideas.”98 Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time directly addresses and counters
Cartesian thinking, providing further reason for Heidegger’s supposed ‘anti-humanism.’
However, such an interpretation of Heidegger is over-simplification. Even though
environmentalists are wont to rally around anti-humanism in their discourse and activism,
Heidegger should not be engaged as such. Kevin Michael Deluca observes that
Heidegger’s thought has been wielded mainly for citation-demand purposes, such that
oftentimes Heidegger will be engaged “not to develop environmental theory; rather,
Heidegger is cited to lend some borrowed legitimacy to the fledgling enterprise….
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wherein Heidegger joins a potpourri of thinkers, including Dōgen, Job, St. Francis of
Assisi,” etc.99 In Heidegger’s “Letter on ‘Humanism’” he does give a sustained criticism
of humanism, however, by arguing that humanism does not treat the human being highly
enough.
ii.
In the “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger addresses a question that was given to
him in a letter: “Comment redonner un sens au mot ‘Humanisme’? [How can we restore
meaning to the word ‘humanism’?].”100 To restore meaning to the word ‘humanism’
implies that the word has lost its meaning. Further, it suggests an intention to retain the
word, an intention Heidegger himself is apprehensive of doing, in that for Heidegger all
‘-isms’ are suspect.101 But because the “market of public opinion” demands novel words,
new “-isms” to capture a body of gathered knowledge for public use, Heidegger will
endeavor to bring sense back into the word ‘humanism,’ but not without heavy criticism
and revision. Heidegger’s critique will above all attempt to show the failure of humanism
to respect human uniqueness and dignity, revealing his preoccupation with preserving
humanity and the humanities as distinct from the natural sciences and technocratic
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reasoning. First, to set a trajectory for such an inquiry into humanism, Heidegger explains
the notion of humanitas as having an origin in Rome:
Humanitas, explicitly so called, was first considered and striven for in the age of
the Roman Republic. Homo humanus was opposed to homo barbarus. Homo
humanus here means the Romans, who exalted and honored Roman virtus through
the “embodiment” of the παιδεία102 [education] taken over from the Greeks.
These were the Greeks of the Hellenistic age, whose culture was acquired in the
schools of philosophy. It was concerned with erudition et institution in bonas
artes [scholarship and training in good conduct]. Παιδεία thus understood was
translated as humanitas.103
This is the first explicit version of humanism: the embodiment of the spirit of paideia, in
the affirmation of education and training in good conduct. Thus, early humanism had for
its emphasis mainly a behavioral transference of tutelage: from being guided by one’s
baser animal nature to being guided by refined faculties attained through re-education,
self-taming, and self-fashioning. In other words, humanism meant the cultivation and
transformation of the unfinished, lacking animal (e.g., homo barbarus) into the civilized
homo humanus. This sense of humanism shares the emancipatory aspect of later
humanism, in which we are freed from impulse and instinct. Heidegger states that
humanism “remains in essence a specifically Roman phenomenon, which emerges from
the encounter of Roman civilization with the culture of late Greek civilization.”104
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This Greek spirit of paideia, per Heidegger, is present in all the succeeding
versions of humanism, including Renaissance, Scholastic, and modern versions found in
Liberalism, Marxism, Existentialism, and Christianity. What is crucial for Heidegger’s
exposition is the assumption that paideia and humanitas are synonymous, an assumption
which has not gone uncontested.105 Vito R. Giustiniani, challenges the assumption that
“every ‘historical’ humanism cannot be anything else than a resurgence of Greek
paideia.”106 Gavin Rae notes that for Giustiniani, this Greek emphasis on culture “does
not fit well with Roman or Renaissance versions.” Heidegger’s “homogenization” of
humanism in terms of the spirit of Greek paideia, according to Giustiniani, is
misinterpreted due to Heidegger’s ‘valorization’ of Greek antiquity. Giustiniani argues
the Heidegger fails to account for the two senses of the word humanitas:
a. Humanitas as the affirmation of a culture of education and reason
b. Humanitas as the cultivation of specific individual character traits
Therefore, Giustiniani’s criticism seem to suggest that, according to Rae, “there are
different versions of humanism because each differs in terms of how it structures the
relation between the dual senses of the term ‘humanitas.’”107 Along with Rae, however,
Heidegger’s (mis)-interpretation of the synonym of humanitas and paideia is actually
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beneficial, for “error can lead to the unveiling of new insights and paths of thought.”108
Sometimes misinterpretation and misreading can open up new horizons of thought. One
paradigmatic example is that of Jean-Paul Sartre’s misreading of Being and Time, a
reading which saddled onto it a generality that Heidegger never intended: the
interpretation of his work as the formulation and commencement of a new philosophical
approach known as Existentialism.
Conceding to Giustiniani that Heidegger’s interpretation fails to appreciate a more
nuanced account of humanitas, if we are to continue we must approach Heidegger’s
homogenization as just a lesser strategic point for use in his larger argument. Taking for
granted Heidegger’s homogenized version of humanism, Heidegger argues that the
defining features within the paideic core of humanism are ultimately metaphysical; each
version of humanism is “either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the
ground of one.”109 It can be argued that Heidegger is anti-metaphysical. Metaphysics, for
Heidegger, is a dead-end road. Why? Heidegger explains:
Metaphysics thinks about beings as beings. Wherever the question is asked what
beings are, beings as such are in sight. Metaphysical representation owes this
sight to the light of Being. The light itself, i.e., that which such thinking
experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking;
for- metaphysics always represents beings only as beings. Within the perspective,
metaphysical thinking does, of course, inquire about the being which is the source
and originator of the light. But the light itself is considered sufficiently
illuminated as soon as we recognize that we look through it whenever we look at
beings.110
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Because metaphysics can only represent ‘beings as beings,’ it can never represent Being,
but only infer it as the ‘light’ by which beings are understood. Traditionally, Being has
been taken as the ‘cosmic ground’ or the ‘all-founding being,’ typically regarded as the
ontological bedrock for metaphysics. Metaphysical thinking cannot penetrate the
meaning and essence of Being, which is not an entity and hence is ungraspable by the
means of traditional, fixed logical categories mentioned above. Metaphysics and the kind
of thinking accompanying it constrains Heidegger’s main project of inquiring into Being,
the main priority that runs through all of Heidegger’s works. “Metaphysics does not ask
about the truth of being itself…Being is still waiting for the time when It itself will
become thought-provoking to the human being.”111 Returning to humanism, Heidegger
identifies three metaphysical features, all of which are present in each version of
humanism, features rejected by Heidegger: (1) the universalization of the essence of
humanity as animal rationale, (2) the fundamental importance and usage of binary
oppositions, and (3) the presupposition of certain truths as being self-evident. I will pass
over (2) and (3) and focus primarily on (1).
Animale Rationale is the canonical Aristotelian definition of human nature. The
definition is problematic for Heidegger for two reasons. Firstly, the Greek zoon logon
echon (animal having capacity for discourse) is falsely translated into the Latin animale
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rationale (rational animal), a translation “conditioned by metaphysics”112 in that it
replaces discourse or language with rationality. Secondly, the comparative context of
animale rationale “will never disclose the essential aspect of the human being.”113 What
do I mean by comparative context? The context in which animale rationale gains its
sense is by way of comparison with animals. Heidegger argues rhetorically whether such
a comparative context is helpful, whether “we are really on the right track toward the
essence of the human being as long as we set him off as one living creature among others
in contrast to plants, beasts, and God?”114 If we are to proceed in such a fashion,
Heidegger exclaims, “we abandon the human being to the essential realm of animalitas
even if we do not equate him with beasts but attribute a specific difference to him.”115
Richard Rorty offers, however tangential, an insightful perspective to the comparative
context, a perspective we shall turn to only briefly.
Notice that in Roman humanism there is the setting up of opposition to some
other, namely to that of homo barbarus. In “Human Rights, Rationality, and
Sentimentality,” Rorty argues that we have been involved in creating distinctions
between ‘paradigmatic humans’ and ‘pseudo-humans’ of borderline cases. Homo
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barbarus were indeed living, breathing humans, but not “true humans.” Rorty explains in
more detail this distinction-making process:
The human-animal distinction, however, is only one of three main ways which we
paradigmatic humans distinguish ourselves from borderline cases. A second is by
invoking the distinction between adults and children. Ignorant and superstitious
people, we say, are like, children; they will attain true humanity only if raised up
by proper education. If they seem incapable of such education, that shows that
they are not really the same kind of being as we educable people are…When it
comes to women, however, there are simpler ways of excluding them from true
humanity: for example, using “man” as a synonym of “human being” …Being a
nonmale is the third way of being nonhuman.116
These methods of distinguishing true humans from non- or in-humans have provided
justification for violence, the reason for not playing nice with those not within the circle
of true humanity. However, to “straighten out this confusion” philosophers became
preoccupied with the question of human identity, specifically with “specifying what is
special about featherless bipeds, explaining what is essential to being human.”117 In other
words, philosophers have been attempting to know who they were by seeing what
separates them from animals, attempting to gain knowledge of the special ingredient that
places humans “in a different ontological category than brutes.”118 The answer was
rationality, and that a “respect for this ingredient provides a reason for people to be nice
to each other.”119 Although Rorty’s interpretation of the motivation behind the question
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of what is “special about featherless bipeds” is mainly understood in regards to rights and
ethical behavior, nevertheless it helps shine a light on why the term animal rationale is
problematic: the comparative context is in the dimension of animalitas. Even though
Heidegger did not address initial motivation for the comparative context in terms of
ethical behavior, he does see it as an issue for defining the essence of humanity.
Heidegger does not explicitly put forth a reason as to why philosophers were motivated to
define the essence of humanity by comparing them to animals, for that is a kind of socialpsychoanalysis that Heidegger was not interested in. Although he does hint in a few
places that doing so brought a kind of ‘ease of explanation,’ as an expedient that
equalized all beings onto a graspable register. However, with such an expedient came the
eschewal of ambiguity, vagueness and indefiniteness for sake of technological
manipulation and serviceability toward human ends. The bottom line is that the
comparative context in the dimension of animalitas is within the problematic manner of
metaphysics,120 hence closing off access to Being.
For Heidegger, the problem with abandoning the human being to the essential
realm of animalitas is that it fails to define humanity on its own terms. Metaphysical
thinking that compares the human being to animals “does not think in the direction of his
humanitas.” To think in the direction of the human being requires a different orientation
to his essence. In an obscure passage, Heidegger attempts to explain that human essence
is to be understood as ‘ek-sistence,’
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Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that the human being
essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by being. Only from
that claim “has” he found that wherein his essence dwells. Only from this
dwelling does he “have” “language” as the home that preserves the ecstatic for his
essence. Such standing in the clearing of being I call the ek-sistence of human
beings. This way of being is proper only to the human being. Ek-sistence so
understood is not only the ground of the possibility of reason, ratio, but is also
that in which the essence of the human being preserves the source that determines
him.121
Let me attempt to unpack this passage. Heidegger is claiming that metaphysics closes
itself to a “simple essential fact.” Namely, the fact “that human being essentially occurs
in his essence” when he is “claimed” by Being. It is only from that claim has the human
being “found wherein his essence dwells.” Humanism has tended to think the essence of
the human being as something that resides ‘inside’ of the human being, a property located
probably somewhere a little bit behind the eyes and half-way into the head from both
ears. Furthermore, humanism has tended to think that essence is something a priori
within our possession, in the same way that my teeth in my head are mine, such that they
have always been mine, and such that my DNA would point to there being in my
possession and not in someone else’s. Rather, what Heidegger is suggesting is that what
constitutes essence is neither something inside of the human being, nor something
intrinsically in my possession, but a way of being as a relationship between humanity and
Being having obtained only through a ‘claim’.
Notice what Heidegger is doing: he is turning the canonical animale rationale on
its head. Firstly, in the canonical definition rationality is the defining, essential property
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that both resides inside of and is intrinsically within the possession of the human being.
For Heidegger, by stating that human essence is found in a relationship with being as a
“standing in the clearing,” he thereby decenters essence and brings it outside.
Additionally, in stating that essence occurs only when there is a ‘claim’ by Being,
Heidegger shows that human essence is not something intrinsic to the human being, but is
given as a gift. Interestingly, in Aristotelian metaphysics relations are classified as
predicables and are considered accidental and therefore non-essential. Furthermore,
because human essence is given from without by Being, it is therefore extrinsic, and
hence, not considered to be something constitutive, showing it to be inadequate in
attempts to define the essence of the human being. Secondly, the canonical definition
gains much of its sense by comparison with animals, a flawed approach because of its
failure to think “in the direction of his humanitas.” The way ek-sistence now gains its
sense is by way of comparison with Being itself.
By claiming that human essence is found within what traditional metaphysics
would regard as non-essential and inadequate, Heidegger disrupts metaphysical thinking.
He intentionally transgresses fixed, traditional, and logical ways of thinking which
fundamentally make use of binary opposites by inverting and playing with the importance
of the essential over the accidental, and the intrinsic over the extrinsic in defining human
being’s ‘essence’. By also claiming that the human being is understood in comparison to
Being instead of animals, Heidegger attempts to derail its primary motive as an
equalization mechanism seeking to define all life on the same level, which thereby fails
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to appreciate human uniqueness. The following table might prove useful in seeing
Heidegger’s inversion process:

Human
Essence

Defining
Property

Property
Location

Property Status

Comparative
Context

Animal
Rationale

Rationality

Inside, Center

Essential,
Intrinsic

Animals

Ek-sistence

Standing in the
Clearing

Outside,
Decentered

Accidental,
Extrinsic

Being

The inversion process is Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the strictures of metaphysical
thinking. However, Heidegger’s critique only serves the purpose of attempting to direct
our gaze back upon Being itself.
Heidegger’s critique against humanism is not an ‘anti-humanism,’ which argues
for a devaluation and levelling of human significance with the endorsement of a kind of
biospheric egalitarianism. Rather, Heidegger claims that we need to keep human dignity
intact, and treat humanity as that unique being that it is. Anti-humanism seems to operate
from a negative rendering of ‘human exceptionalism,’ which is seen as the cause of all
environmental issues: this bloated sense of worth and right over the environment. I will
argue that Heidegger does maintain human exceptionalism, but not in the destructive
kind. Heidegger does share with anti-humanists the concern with domination and
technical exploitation over the environment. Heidegger provides an account of the origin
of the exploitative mood in a form of revealing. Furthermore, Heidegger’s work shows
that human beings should not be singled out for moral blame.
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IV.

HEIDEGGER, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE EXPLOITATIVE
MOOD
Why critique technology? Why call into question that which affords us with a

better standard of living? The car that I drive affords me with the convenience of not
having to burn as many calories by walking or running to my destination, my cell phone
connects me to relatives far away, and the micro-wave in the kitchen saves me from
having to gather wood to make a fire. The surface level ecological answer is that
technology’s convenience and labor-saving benefits come at a price. The pollution from
our vehicles, the plastic wrappers and containers from our food and gadgets, and the
radioactive waste buried deep underground threaten the stability of our natural
environment. A much more significant, and deeply rooted answer will inevitably be
revealed in our reading of Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology. In it we
see a sustained criticism against that which the environmentalists address, the Western
exploitative attitude most evident in modern technology. Most importantly, and contrary
to its critics, humanism is not to blame for such an attitude. What is to blame is a way of
revealing, a framework for making sense of things whose origin lies not in man’s doing,
but in Being’s.
It should be noted at the outset that Heidegger’s project is not another reactionary
polemic against the evils of technology. As Hubert Dreyfus observes:
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…although many respectable philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas, take him
to be doing just that; nor is he doing what progressive thinkers such as Habermas
want him to do, proposing a way to get technology under control so that it can
serve our rationally chosen ends.122
The reason for getting clear about this stems from the fact that Heidegger himself has not
always been clear about his own approach, lending an interpretation of his work as the
dissemination of anti-technological platitudes. For example, in his attack on consumerism
during the war:
The circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure
which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an
unworld.123
Another example, from an address given to Schwarzwald peasant:
Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the
movies carry them off into uncommon, but often merely common, realms of
imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world. All that with which
modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail, and drive man—all that is
already much closer to man today than his fields around his farmstead, closer than
the sky over the earth, closer than the change from night to day, closer than the
conventions and customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world.124
On the face of it, this passage portrays the sentiment of a crotchety old man, one whose
attitude toward modern technology can be echoed contemporarily by a grandfather’s
grumbling protest against his grandson’s cell-phone usage, an item of technology
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criticized for brainwashing and preventing the young boy from experiencing the real
world. One final example will suffice:
The world now appears as an object open to attacks of calculative thought.
Attacks that nothing is believe able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a
gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.125
Such passages, as Dreyfus observes, seem to portray Heidegger as a kind of luddite.126
Yet, care must be taken to not conclude prematurely in that regard.
I agree with Dreyfus that we need to carefully chart an interpretive path that
disaffiliates his stance on technology as being just another “romantic reaction to the
domination of nature.”127 The worry in making sense of Heidegger’s thinking about
technology is that we run the risk of translating his words into “conventional platitudes
about the evils of technology.”128 We should not prematurely mistake Heidegger’s
ontological concerns with “humanistic worries about the devastation of nature.”129 As
Dreyfus summarizes, “Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by
technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific
technologies.”130 That being said, against Dreyfus I argue that, even though we should be
charitable towards interpreting his worry as being primarily ontological in nature,
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nevertheless Heidegger’s thought contains residues of ideas beneficial to the
environmentalist conversation. When Heidegger addresses the main ontological issue, he
thereby opens up a space and another interpretive framework wherein we can address and
make sense of issues revolving around environmental devastation. Consequently, his
thought can provide us with ways in which we may do something about it.
In questioning technology, it is beneficial to note Heidegger’s attempt to develop
another way of being, one called thinking, in which our thinking is about Being. In his
Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger observes that the “[m]ost thought provoking in our
thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.”131 We are currently in an age of
thoughtlessness, referring specifically to our modern technological age. Contrary to our
modern age, the age of the Greeks addressed the importance and purpose of thinking.
Parmenides’ famous statement that ‘One should both say and think that Being is,’132
caught Heidegger’s attention: we should be thinking about Being, for it is Being that
calls for thinking. If it is Being, and not beings that calls for thinking, then according to
Heidegger in our thinking about our thinking we soon realize that we are not thinking. In
our modern age, what calls for thinking is the antithesis of Being, namely its withdrawal
or absence. We have forgotten Being’s call for thinking, and thus “remain unfree and
chained to technology.”133
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Heidegger speaks of this way of thinking in various ways. In one sense, thinking
occurs in response to deficiency in activity, and it attends to things made into objects.
The thinking process, attending to and thinking about objects, is for the purpose of
understanding it: either to fix it, or to speculate about it, whether ‘it’ is the
malfunctioning equipment, the purpose of the activity, etc.). Heidegger calls this das
rechnende Denken. The word das Rechnen is usually translated as ‘to reckon,’ and is
associated with the compound berechnen, meaning ‘to calculate.’ Thus, it is ‘calculative
thinking,’ and it is conveyed with disapproval by Heidegger: “Everydayness takes Dasein
as something at hand that is taken care of, that is, regulated and calculated [verrechnet].
“Life” is a “business”, whether or not it covers its cost.”134 This type of thinking
“…roams to and fro only within a fixed horizon, within its boundary, although it does not
see it.”135
Calculative thinking operates by responding to objects, to beings, in a linear and
calculative way. Heidegger also at times calls this “merely thinking” [denkend,
denkmäßig]: the general, run of the mill type of thinking employed in our everyday lives.
However, Heidegger contrasts this type of thinking with genuine, appropriate thinking
located at the top of a thinking-hierarchy, one which tends toward transcending horizonal
standpoints. This type of thinking is truly philosophical. Inwood interprets Heidegger’s
account of philosophical thinking as an inquiry that “knows only “matters” [Sachen] as

134

Heidegger, Being and Time, 289-290.

135

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. III, The Will to Power as Art, trans. Joan Stambough, D.F.
Krell, F.A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 143.

54

possible sources and motives of questioning and of the development of the respects in
which they are to be questions.”136 This is summed up with the phrase, Philosophie ist
Philosophieren, or “philosophy is philosophizing,”137 and is not to be regarded as a body
of answers to questions. More specifically, philosophical thinking “…points the direction
in which we have to search...”138 Genuine philosophical thinking asks questions, and not
merely for the sake of answers. It asks questions in such a way that questioning continues
and does not foreclose on other horizons of meanings and possibilities. Finally, it reflects
back onto the questioning itself, questioning the questioners’ own questioning standpoint.
Calculative thinking is also seen as an activity wherein a thinker is roused into
thinking solely on the basis of volition. Yet, all types of thinking, whether calculative or
the approved kind, stand for an after-the-fact response to the provocation of something
else. Heidegger, according to Inwood, exploits thinking’s affinity in the German, as
denken, with the word “Dank, danken, ‘thanks’, ‘to thank’, which once meant ‘to think,
remember;”139 emphasizing thinking’s relationship to ideas such as remembrance, as
recollection, as response, as thanking. Thinking as thanking is firstly about recognizing
yourself as having been, and as continuing to be, provoked by what presents itself.
Secondly, thinking as thanking appreciates that that is so. Thinking as thanking is both
the recognition of the fact of thinking’s own occurring as being provoked by what
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presents itself, and actually being thankful for it. Thinking in the lower sense, as
calculative thinking, even though owing its origin to being provoked by what presents
itself, it nevertheless remains closed off from this aspect of thinking in this higher sense.
Hence calculative thinking is unable to heed Parmenidean dictum ‘to say and think that
Being is’; it can neither recognize that it indeed owes its origin to what presents itself, nor
can it be thankful for what presents itself. Calculative thinking is one that is trapped
within a fixed horizonal standpoint.
In our modern age, what we are being called by is the opposite of Being, its
voided leftover space. In other words, Being’s being-forgotten, or its withdrawal
(Seinsvergessenheit). Therefore, from his work on thinking I see three motives for
Heidegger’s inquiry into technology. Firstly, to build on a new way of being, one of
thinking which thinks about Being. Secondly, to chart Being’s being-forgotten, wherein
Being withdraws most evidently in our modern technological age. Thirdly, to articulate
the essence of technology for the purpose of establishing a free-relationship with it, in
such a way that “we shall be able to experience the technological within its own
bounds.”140 As Dreyfus argues, the “greatest danger” in modern technology is not
necessarily “the destruction of nature or culture but a restriction in our of thinking—a
leveling of our understanding of being.”141
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Moving forward in the questioning of technology, Heidegger seeks to clarify
technology as separate from the essence of technology. Why does he split up technology
with technology’s essence? Because the two are not equivalent, and doing so will help us
remain free in our relationship to technology. Heidegger’s explanation is a bit
paradoxical:
When we are seeking the essence of “tree,” we have to become aware that That
which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered
among all the other trees.142
The “that which pervades every tree, as tree,” or the tree’s essence, when distributed to
other trees, results in an encounter which treats each tree in a universal and uniformal
fashion. Heidegger is warning of the dangers of reification. In other words, when we
collapse the thing in question with its essence, rather than keeping them apart, we run the
risk of flattening out the particulars of the thing and over-defining it only in terms of
certain features picked, those features which capture what it is. Essence becomes reified,
or made concrete in such a way that produces an inflexible relationship. For example,
when someone thinks of a slice of pizza, they more than likely associate it with being
triangle in shape. The triangleness becomes most salient, and is utilized as a cognitive
shorthand for dealing with the object; it is less taxing on the mind to work with simple,
abstract features than to work with more nuanced, complicated features. In short, while
recognizing that a thing has an essence, or a set of features defining what it is, it also has
particular features which outrun the simple, reified, cognitive shorthand way of
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encountering it. There are other ways that the thing in question can be defined and
encountered. For example, a rubber tire may be defined from its traditional feature as a
rolling-thing. It may also be defined as a swing for children, as a planter for vegetables
and flowers, and as building material for rammed Earth thermal mass dwellings.
Briefly indicated above, “[a]ccording to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is
considered to be what the thing is.”143 To inquire into technology is to ask what it is, to
ask what its essence is. Yet, technology’s essence is not necessarily technological.
Technology is normally taken to mean two things: (1) as a means to an end, and (2) as a
human activity. “The two definitions belong together.”144 To postulate an end is a human
activity, and to conceive of means to achieve postulated ends is likewise a human
activity. Technology is therefore taken to be a whole complex of “contrivances,” or
instruments, from the Latin instrumentum. Heidegger describes this definition of
technology as the “instrumental and anthropological definition,”145 and it normally goes
unchallenged.
It may be correct to say that technology is instrumental, but according to
Heidegger, it need not be true. Heidegger claims that for something to be correct, it must
undergo ‘fixing,’ and thus “fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in
its essence.”146 Fixing allows us to cope effectively with that pertinent thing under our
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consideration. We can fix onto the tire the correct assessment that it is a rolling-thing, but
that does not mean its truth, its essence, is to be a rolling-thing. The thing may allow for
multiple correct definitions of it (it is indeed correct to say that a tire is a rolling-thing, a
planter-thing, and a building-material thing), but its whatever-it-is, its truth and essence,
outruns fixed definitions. Likewise, the “correct instrumental definition of technology
still does not show us technology’s essence.” To accomplish a free-relationship with
technology, it is required to keep this notion in mind. Heidegger however concedes and
agrees with the notion that the only way to the truth of technology’s essence, or to come
close to it, is to “seek the true by way of the correct.”147 Thus, if it is correct to say that
technology is instrumental, what exactly do we mean by the word ‘instrumental?’
Instrumentality lies in means and ends, in which means are employed as a cause
for the attainment of desired ends. “Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed,
wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.”148 Heidegger harkens back
Aristotle’s explanation of ‘why’ questions that can be classed into four causal answers.
Firstly, the causa materialis, which is the constitutive, material composition of a thing.
Secondly, the causa formalis, which is the arrangement of the thing’s material
composition into a shape or form. Thirdly, the causa efficiens, which is the agent that
brings about the effect. And fourthly, the causa finalis, which is the for-the-sake-of, end
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goal, or overall purpose of the causal process. Thus, instrumentality can be traced back to
fourfold causality, and technology as a means therefore discloses itself as the correct
definition. But further still, Heidegger asks, what do we mean by causality?
Typically, a cause is simply “that which brings something about.”149 The ‘that
which brings’ is more significant than the ‘something about’. However, as Heidegger
notes, in that case causa efficiens sets the standard for causality among the four; final
cause, or the product, is eclipsed in significance. We do not typically regard the product
as a cause, although it may cause in us a desire as a goad for setting ourselves to work,
nevertheless the actual working toward that goal is regarded as the cause par excellence;
quintessentially a cause lies in the moment that the nail is driven into the wood from the
force of the hammer. Conversely, Heidegger claims that causality should be understood
with the emphasis on the product, in which it gains its sense from an etymological origin
in the verb cadere, meaning ‘to fall’. What it means to fall is “that which brings it about
that something falls out as a result in such and such a way.”150 Heidegger explains:
The doctrine of the four causes goes back to Aristotle. But everything that later
ages seek in Greek thought under the conception and rubric “causality,” in the
realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought per se has simply nothing at all to
do with bringing about and effecting. What we call cause [Ursache] and the
Romans call causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something else in
indebted. The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of
being responsible for something else.151
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To-fall and being-responsible-for are important notions for Heidegger. Firstly, in that tofall means to bring about a result that falls in line with the thing’s nature, and reveals
something about it. When I push a bowling ball off the table, the result of it falling to the
floor obtains because of how it is as a rolling, heavy thing. It has a disposition and
tendency, which when efficiently caused, produces a result. The result discloses
something about the bowling ball, namely its heaviness and its round-feature, and its
tendency to fall and make a dent in the floor. The result is in line with what it is, and
reveals something about what it is.
When I am responsible for the bowling ball, I am doing something to it (as an
agent of causation) in such a way that brings about the result that aligns with the nature
and disposition of the thing. I am revealing something about it in my being-responsiblefor, and am utilizing the fourfold in such a way that each in turn are co-responsible for
and indebted to each other, resulting in a revelatory disclosure of an aspect of the thing’s
nature, of whatever-it-is. To clarify, Heidegger gives a concrete example with aid of a
silver chalice:
As this matter (hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted
to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out of which it consists. But the
sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted
to the silver appears in the aspect of a chalice and not in that of a brooch or a ring.
Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of
chaliceness. Both the silver into which the aspect is admitted as chalice and the
aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for
the sacrificial vessel.152
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Keep in mind that all the terms ‘being-responsible-for’, ‘being-indebted-to’, ‘coresponsible-for’, are forward looking: they point away from the process toward the result,
toward the big reveal of an aspect of a thing’s nature. Each step in the causal process
works up to a fall, a natural consequence and result of following along responsibly with
the nature of the thing.
In revealing an aspect of a thing, there is another act by the agent, one that was
mentioned above. Namely, that of ‘fixing,’ or as Heidegger puts it regarding the silver
chalice, “that which in advance confines the chalice within the realm of consecration and
bestowal.”153 In working on the silver, being-responsible for it, the circumscription of
boundaries (form) for a completed goal (product) takes place. The product, even though
in advanced fixed and circumscribed, nevertheless aligns with the thing’s nature and
reveals something new and interesting about it. Recall earlier my talk of rubber tires. The
whatever-it-is thing we label a tire has multiple aspects: it has the aspect of being a
rolling-thing, an aspect of being vessel-like, and an aspect of being building material. In
other words, the thing’s nature can be put to use in multiple ways, ultimately for the sake
of revealing aspects of it. Causality is for the sake of revealing aspects, and ultimately for
the sake of revealing generally, namely that of truth (alētheia). The fourfold causality
mentioned above, Heidegger argues, should be understood as four ways of being
responsible for something in terms of truth.
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In questioning technology’s essence, Heidegger arrives at revealing when
questioning the ‘correct’ definition of technology as instrument. As Heidegger
summarizes, when we “inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means,
actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing.”154 Thus, technology is not simply
instrumentality, however correct it is to say so. At bottom, technology is about alētheia.
Technology’s essence lies not within means-end instrumentality, but in the revealing of
aspects. “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.”155
Let us trace Heidegger’s inquiry and take stock. Firstly, he questions technology
by asking what it is. Namely, technology is an instrument. It is a correct assessment to
say that technology is instrumental, but that does not mean that its essence is
instrumental, nor that its essence is even technological.156 Secondly, he questions what it
means to be an instrument, and discovers that it has something to do with means and
ends, with causality. Referencing Aristotle’s fourfold causality, Heidegger observes that
causality traditionally understood focuses more on the actual causal moment, as a middlefunction, and less on the resulting product that the causal process leads to. Heidegger
responds with an etymological analysis and re-definition of the verb ‘to cause,’ which
highlights the resulting part of the causal process. Instead of the word ‘causality,’
Heidegger employs ‘being-responsible-for’ to deemphasize the role of the middle-
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function as being subordinate to, and as less significant than, the final resulting product at
the end. That thing at the end is a revelation of an aspect. For Heidegger, inquiry into
technology arrives at truth.
Heidegger then addresses the word technology itself. In Greek, we have the word
Technikon, which stems from the word technē that primarily covers a whole range of
human activities involving skill, craftsmanship, and even the fine arts. Technē also has
been linked with knowledge in the widest sense, meaning “to be entirely at home in
something, to understand and be expert in it.”157 Heidegger then shows that technē is
“bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic.”158 Likewise with instrumentality,
technē leads us back to the conclusion of revealing, of alētheia. Technology at bottom,
understood definitionally as instrument, and etymologically as technē, is inescapably a
form of revealing. Even modern technology, “when we allow our attention to rest on this
fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern technology show itself to
us.”159 Even though modern technology is a form of revealing, Heidegger shows that it is
unlike its ancient predecessors.
Modern technology, even though a form of revealing, does not reveal in a poietic
way, but in a challenging way (Herausfordern). Revealing an aspect of something can
take the form of a revealing that aligns with the nature of the thing, a poeitic way, and
one that does not align with the nature of the thing, a challenging way. Both equally
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reveal truth, although both equally do not reveal truthfully. Challenging, for Heidegger,
“puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and
stored as such.”160 This challenging does not regard nature according to its own essence,
of bringing forth what it is in its fullness out of concealment. Rather, challenging sets
upon (stellen) nature an order and structure which is useful to humanity; it is a way of
regarding solely for the purpose of storing up nature’s energies to be used on a later
occasion. To store up and use later is to expedite nature’s processes. Expediting allows
one to speed up the process that would otherwise occur freely and naturally, and to store
up the beneficial energies for a later use.
Expediting is directed toward “driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum
expense.”161 The energy that has been expedited places objects ‘on-call’ for further use,
for further extraction of energy. Additionally, when the energy in objects is placed oncall for further use, nature as a whole becomes transformed into what Heidegger calls
‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). In other words, nature is placed on-call for further use and
is placed both metaphorically and literally in stockpiles. In regarding nature merely as
that which is standing-reserve, one fails to reveal what it truthfully is, failing to regard
and appreciate it as having its own essence which outruns any sense of usability. Objects
in nature lose their own-ness, and their own nature as standing-against (Gegenstand)
human interests162 is denied and kept concealed. Though aspects are revealed, namely the
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usable features, yet other aspects and its essence remains hidden. Furthermore, those
usable features become reified. Modern technology thus results in what Dreyfus
summarized as the “restriction in our of thinking—a leveling of our understanding of
being.”163
The answer to the environmentalist’s query concerning the origin of the Western
exploitative mood now seems obvious: it is this challenging way of revealing that denies
ownness to things and causes man to treat nature uniformly as mere resource towards our
own ends. But where does this challenging itself originate from? The environmentalist
will say that it stems from man’s self-perception as being at the center of things.
However, Heidegger claims that this way of challenging is not under our control, nor is it
something that man brought about. Heidegger explains,
Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which that we call the
real is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extend is man
capable of such a revealing? Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through
this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or
withdraws.164
The challenging way of revealing is not under our control. Further still, un-concealment,
and the revealing and withdrawing of the ‘real’ is likewise not up to us. If revealing and
withdrawing are not the product of man’s handiwork, then what is it a product of? Where
does it come from?
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The answer to that question is far from easy, and has been misinterpreted in
mystical terms, but for sake of discussion it is the real itself, namely Being. It is “That
which has already claimed man and has done so, so decisively that he can only be man at
any given time as the one so claimed.”165 Recall earlier the notion of thinking as a kind of
response, as thanking, in which something else provokes the thinker in order for thinking
to commence. Heidegger argues that all ways of unconcealing are not something brought
about by man. Those ways are allotted to man in his already being claimed by the real.
Heidegger summarizes:
The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass whenever it calls
man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to him. When man, in his way,
from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to
the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it. Thus when man,
investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has
already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach
nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the
objectlessness of standing-reserve.166
Thus, it is the real’s own doing: it unconceals itself. From this we can counter the
environmentalist’s attack on humanism, for it is up to Being for the way in which we
view and therefore treat the world. To be clear, this concern for Heidegger remains most
explicitly within the realm of ontology. However, ontology—how we regard objects and
beings—bleeds into and informs our interactions. Exploitation necessarily follows from
the challenging way that Being is unconcealed.
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This challenging way of revealing, Heidegger goes on to discuss, is granted by
Being. It is a claim that Being has upon man, in which it “gathers man thither to order the
self-revealing as standing-reserve.”167 Heidegger calls this Ge-stell, or enframing. The
word ge-stell means something like a framework, a “gathering together of that settingupon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of
ordering, as standing-reserve.”168 If the essence of technology is to be understood in
terms revealing, of alētheia, then modern technology’s essence also has to do with
revealing, but as a revealing that challenges, as ge-stell, which is “the way in which the
real reveals itself as standing-reserve.”169 If it is not man’s sole doing for the Western
exploitative mood, the question might therefore be, ‘Where do we point the blame?’
Do we point the blame outside of man, to Being itself? No. Being is not a ‘thing’
to be blamed, and man still has a part in it, for revealing does not happen beyond all
human doing. Yet, we cannot blame man solely, as the critics of humanism (i.e.,
homocentrism) are wont to do, because “neither does it happen exclusively in man, or
decisively through man.”170 Instead, we should stop playing the blaming game, for there
is no clear-cut answer; blaming is something we should transcend if we want to be
effective about changing our current condition. We can locate the root of the issue as
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being a mood of exploitation without assigning definite moral blame on a particular
party.
In the next section I will show how Heidegger’s philosophy challenges the
environmentalists’ strategy by questioning their motives. Afterward, even though
Heidegger eschews a reactionary ethics against this way of viewing the world, some of
his other later works seem to suggest a counter-strategy, in which passivity is to be
preferred over activity, and in which releasement (letting beings be without exploitation)
is to be preferred over the way of challenging. Though allowing for truthful revealing, of
poiēsis, it is also contributive as a counter-strategy for ‘doing’ something about the
environment in a way that keeps human dignity in place, keeps humanism free from guilt,
and offsets the hidden underlying problems with modern environmental problem-solving.
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HEIDEGGER’S ENVIRONMENTALISM: HIS CHALLENGE AND HIS
ALTERNATIVE

V.

Heidegger identifies the root cause of the Western exploitative mood in a form of
revealing. Both man and Being are co-responsible for it, yet neither can be singled out for
moral blame. We should move away from the blaming game, move away from criticism
of humanism and move towards being more efficacious about the environment. Some
have argued that Heidegger proffers a sort of ‘ground-plan’ for doing something about
the environment, most notably Michael Zimmerman.171 On the other hand, thinkers such
as Kevin Michael Deluca deny that Heidegger’s philosophy provides anything like
ground-plan. Instead, Heidegger offers a way of thinking, one that provides us with “the
gift of distress that provokes us to question our presuppositions and goals;”172 the
presuppositions and goals being those within environmentalism. Heidegger helps us to
question the environmentalist’s own presuppositions regarding humanity’s relation to
nature, and humanity’s and environmental groups’ relation to industrialism and
technology. With the aid of Deluca, it will be shown that Heidegger offers a challenge to
the environmentalist, while at the same time, and against Deluca, providing a counter-
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strategy to the Western exploitative mood and a ground-plan “that will lead us out of the
current crisis in culture and environment.”
Heidegger’s philosophy highlights certain stasis points, according to Deluca.
These stasis points are pertinent for environmental discussion, and Heidegger’s work
helps to challenge and to surpass them. For Deluca, the first stasis point in environmental
discussion revolves around humanity’s relation to nature. For the environmental critic of
humanism, humanity sees itself as being at the center of things, assigning intrinsic value
to itself, and instrumental value to nonhuman animals and objects. Yet, according to
Deluca, Heidegger shows that environmentalists themselves are still trapped within that
mindset they so reject. “To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian
world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the earth is
object to humanity’s subject.”173 How is this so? Acts of conservation and strategies for
saving the earth are bound up with the subject’s interest. For example, the saving of the
rain forests is motivated upon the realization that the forests “contain potential medical
resources and because they alleviate global warming.”174 From this awareness that the
motives of environmentalists are too anthropocentric came radical environmentalism, the
proponents of what is known as ‘deep’ ecology, who criticize other environmentalists as
being too ‘shallow’. Yet, as Deluca has shown, in their attempts to avoid
anthropocentrism radical environmentalists run into many problems.
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On the theoretical level, “in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all
beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is levelled.”175
What happens here is a deflation of human significance, such that difference is levelled,
individual uniqueness is brought down so that nothing is special. One problem about this
is that values are incoherent and “always relational,” such that “to posit intrinsic
worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to
other beings and their environment.”176 Another problem is that in denying difference we
“blunt analysis of our current situation” and deny “the differential levels of effects
different species have.”177
On a practical level, avoiding anthropocentrism means advocating misanthropy.
For example, the radical group Earth First! label humanity as a cancer on the planet.
Likewise, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, who claim that humans are
intrinsically incompatible with the bio-/ecosphere, seem to advocate a hatred for
humanity. The metaphor that humans are cancer, as a singled-out disease of the planet,
suggests that humans are “an alien other, not a part but apart.”178 It portrays humanity as
actively preying upon the earth. In this respect, Cartesianism is still intact because of the
implicit use of dichotomization in their rhetoric: subject-object, human-animal, culture-
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nature, and civilization-wilderness dichotomies undergird their notions. Even current
debates in environmentalism concerning various groups’ dismissal of other groups for
being too anthropocentric are themselves trapped within this stasis point, because both
sides (pro- or anti-anthropocentrists) remain “oblivious to the underlying Cartesian
presuppositions they both share.”179 Reform and ‘shallow’ environmentalists privilege
humanity, whereas radical and ‘deep’ environmentalists deflate or demonize humanity,
yet both are ensnared in Cartesianism. Heidegger helps shed critical light on the
underlying motives of environmentalism. His thinking on “the subject-object dichotomy,
Descartes, and the phenomenology of the structure of reality offer a useful lever with
which to displace these dichotomies and challenge traditional ontology that undergirds
and girdles environmental thinking.”180 To surpass this stasis point, Heidegger’s work
helps to displace the subject-object dichotomy such that it opens up “a horizon of
possibilities of other ways/beginning/trajectories for environmentalism.”181
Another stasis point revolves around “the conflict between strategies of reformist
mainstream groups and grassroots activist groups.”182 Reformists tend to work within
dominant industrial systems while radical groups work outside those systems and
question their validity. The debate between the two is often framed “on pragmatic versus
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moral grounds: realistic reformers versus idealistic radicals or hypocritical reformers
versus principled radicals.”183 Heidegger, in offering a critique of technology, provides a
challenge and another orientation transcending both the reformist and radical impulse.
Although harshly condemned on ontological grounds, technological enframing is
necessary in the historical unfolding of Being. Machination (machenschaft), a word not
yet discussed, is the fundamental feature of our modern epoch.
In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger writes of the growing domination of
calculatedness in our dealings with representational objects. He writes: “[M]achination
[is] that interpretation of beings as re-presentable and re-presented. In one respect, representable means “accessible to intention and calculation”; in another respect in means
“advanceable through pro-duction and execution.”184 Heidegger speaks of the ‘shackles’
of machination as the “pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything
draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself—yes,
totally other than just alien.”185 In Mindfulness Heidegger writes:
Machination means the accordance of everything with producibility, indeed in
such a way that the unceasing, unconditioned reckoning of everything is
predirected.186
Machination also,
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…fosters in advance the completely surveyable calculability of the subjugating
empowering of being to an accessible arrangement…Modern technicity releases
man into the urge towards structuring his massive way of being through which
every human particularity is overpowered[.]187
Deluca notes that environmental strategizing, whether in the reform or radical kind,
contributes and is in lockstep with the dictates of machination. Environmental strategy
falls victim to and perpetuates machination. For reformists, this involves “setting up
headquarters in the political center (Washington D.C.) of global capitalism—arguably the
finest manifestation of the logic of machination.”188 For radicals, they have “increasingly
relied on managing images and manipulating media,”189 contributing to grassroots
oppositional public relations, which partakes of the logic of machination. Furthermore,
the manipulation and dissemination of media itself is machination. “What are the
consequence when Greenpeace champions the cause of furry baby harp seals at the
neglect of less photogenic indicator species?”190 Instead, what Heidegger offers is the
“admonishment to question what it takes for granted…”191
Heidegger’s philosophy provides a better kind of environmentalism than that of
both the reform and the radical sort. Firstly, he achieves this by setting out new
possibilities in terms of ‘thinking’ shown earlier. Donald Turner discusses Heidegger’s

187

Ibid.

188

Deluca, Thinking with Heidegger, 77.

189

Ibid.

190

Ibid.

191

Ibid., 77-78.

75

philosophy as illuminating other modes of thought that might be characterized as being
more responsible and caring, providing the groundwork for a way of being that does not
set upon the world the demand to extract energy and power. This is the positive aspect of
Heidegger that Deluca was apprehensive about, for he regarded Heidegger as only
providing the gift of distress and critique. Yet, for Turner “Heidegger valorizes and
promotes modes of thinking that are more reticent and observatory, modes that he thinks
the Western tradition has neglected.”192 The value in Heidegger’s work stems from his
distinguishing “the human capacity to let beings show themselves authentically—to let
them be—from the human tendency to recognize only what practical use we might make
of the world, forcing being into appropriate conceptual and existential forms.”193
Bringing back to focus the notion of ‘thinking,’ there is another mode of thinking
in addition to ‘thanking,’ what Heidegger calls ‘meditative thinking’ (besinnlichen
Denken). Meditative thinking, for Heidegger, “demands of us not to cling one-sidedly to
a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas.”194 This kind of thinking
allows for an openness of interpreted meanings, and is not ‘one-sidedly’ concerned with
profit or loss. For example, when I view a tree and think about it in a calculative manner,
I may think about it in terms of material for shelter, firewood to keep me warm, safety
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from predators, an obstruction to my path, etc. The tree is reduced to human needs.
However, when I view a tree without merely relating it to my needs, I allow it to be what
it is in its own multiform way. In meditative thinking, I am released from the calculative
treatment of entities, and released to a pure, un-defined presence. Both modes of thanking
and meditative thinking, Turner writes:
…are markedly reticent and reluctant to proclaim final and decisive ontological
defintions and value assessments, and they involved pausing to reflect or meditate
upon being before making presumptive reckonings or calculations, free of the
‘illusion…that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his
construct.’195
In other words, these modes of thinking eschew hastiness, and promote calm and careful
considerations; they call for patient listening. How exactly does this affect the
environment, and how does this contribute to environmentalism?
Heidegger regards human beings as shepherds of Being, and as such, Heidegger
promotes a thinking that heeds protectively. To see how he comes to this conclusion, let
us look at Heidegger’s account of ‘dwelling’. Dwelling can mean either originary
dwelling, one which is poetic, as in the line from Hölderlin:
Humans dwell on this earth
Full of merit, but also poetically.
Or dwelling can mean unpoetic dwelling, the constitutive way of being in our present age
due to an excess of “raging measuring and calculating.”196 In Heidegger’s “Building,
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Dwelling, Thinking”, poetic dwelling is defined in terms of how mortals “rescue the
earth.” Hanspeter Padrutt identifies two senses of ‘to rescue’. Rescuing (saving) is
understood not only as (i) “a rescuing of something from danger,” but also (ii) as “freeing
something into its own way of being.”197 When man dwells poetically, we “spare, protect,
and preserve (shonen) the ‘fourfold’ of earth, sky, god, and humans.”198 Dwelling
poetically therefore means preserving, or ‘safeguarding’ the fourfold in terms of freeing it
into its own way of being.” Interestingly, the Greek word for ‘dwell’ is oikeo, from which
it is derived from oikos meaning ‘house’ or ‘household,’ from which the word ‘ecology’
has its origin.
To preserve and safeguard the fourfold presupposes that we are in such a
shepherding position to begin with. Recall earlier Heidegger’s re-working of what it
means to be human in terms of ‘ek-sisting’. According to Mario Wenning, to ‘ek-sist’
means to step “outside not only with regard to particular objects, but with respect to
Being in general.”199 This new way of characterizing the human being does not signal a
new trajectory for Heidegger, but as Padrutt observes with Heidegger’s earlier work in
BT, “the basic thrust in Being and Time is a shifting, whereby what philosophy up to now
has displaced into the self-enclosed place of consciousness is shifted in the open expanse
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of the Da.”200 Heidegger’s reworking of what it means to be human was to displace
Cartesianism and ‘homocentricm,’ and it ran through all of his works. In ek-sisting, we
are involved in an activity; ek-sisting is a way and a verb. If our essence is not a ‘what,’
but a ‘way,’ then there are certain implications for the nonhuman world. But first, how
does Heidegger regard the nonhuman world?
In Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, a book composed of
lectures given in the years 1929-1930, Heidegger provides his first major treatment of
topics concerning the definition of organisms, animal behavior, and environment (i.e., the
nonhuman). In his attempt to answer the question concerning “What is World?”,
Heidegger offers a comparative analysis of three guiding theses:
1. The Stone is Worldless
2. The Animal is Poor in World
3. Man is World-Forming
The comparative analysis unfolds by focusing on a perspective, namely on the specific
relation that each subject in question (stone, animal, man) has toward the world. Starting
with the middle thesis, that the animal is poor in world, Heidegger states that the animal
is poor, suggesting poverty as opposed to richness. Poverty entails the possession of
something less. Less of what? Less concerning the notion of accessibility, “of whatever
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as an animal it can deal with, of whatever it can be affected by as an animal, of whatever
it can relate to as a living being.”201 Lesser in relation to who?
For Heidegger, the range of accessibility for an animal is lesser than that of man.
Heidegger claims that animals are driven primarily by instincts, with their behavior
governed by the ‘reflex arc,’ a stimulus-response mechanism directed toward some end.
Heidegger summarizes this as a driven performance (Treiben). Further, this driven
performance results from animals’ being intrinsically absorbed and locked into
themselves, from being captivated (benommen) with their own instinctual
preoccupations. What results, according to Heidegger, is the inability for animals to grasp
something as being present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), or as something explicit in terms of
understanding it in bare facts. In other words, animals cannot recognize something as
being present, even if that something in question is present. For example, if a bee sucks
up honey from a bowl, it will get to a point where it is met with the presence of having
too much honey. However, it does not recognize it as such, but the presence becomes
something too much for the bee to cope with, in which case it will stop sucking.
However, if the abdomen is removed while it is sucking the honey from the bowl, it will
continue to carry out its behavior regardless of the fact of there being too much honey; it
continues with the driven activity because the belly fails to get full, which then fails to
signal satiety.
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As opposed to poverty, man is rich; man can recognize the presence of something
as such, and can populate and deepen his range of accessible things which can be dealt
with. Unlike man, the animal is primarily trapped inside its own limited instincts, fated to
perform a behavior directed toward some end. Additionally, man can override any sense
of drivenness. Man can short-circuit the inertia of instinctual urges and develop himself
beyond what an animal can, a point shared and encouraged within humanism. These three
notions, of being able to recognize presence as such, of being able to extend worlds, and
of being able to override instinct, seem to suggest a fundamental difference between man
and animal, with man higher up on the chain of being.
However, even though man is higher up on a chain of being, Heidegger’s reworking of the what it means it be human, and his philosophy in general, signals a
reversal of the human-world relationship: emphasizing passivity over activity, and
letting-be over technical manipulation. Keeping human uniqueness in place, however,
Heidegger then reorients everything else in such a way that this fact does not go to our
heads. As Wenning notes, this calls for the “gradual replacement of anthro- or Daseincentrism with pastoral-centrism.”202 Heidegger’s vision of human uniqueness cancels out
any sense of conceit by defining humanity as shepherd and not as exploiter. Yet,
according to Wenning, this alone already commits the original sin of humanism. I agree,
and that is just fine. There is nothing inherently wrong with viewing humanity as unique.
Keeping uniqueness in place helps to retain dignity in the face of the levelling and
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deflating powers that be. What are the roles of a shepherd regarding the nonhuman?
Shepherds can either let it be, protect it, or allow it to flourish.
Returning to dwelling, Heidegger’s work contributes to a positive ecological
message with this sense of shepherding in mind. Padrutt identifies the phrase ‘ComingForth Holding-in-Reserve’ to be of importance in the connection between Heidegger’s
work and ecology/environmentalism. For Heidegger, the Greeks in the classical age
“caught sight of the sayable from out of a ‘coming-forth holding-in-reserve.”203 This
echoes the Parmenidean dictum earlier that one should both say and think that Being is.
The notion of ‘coming-forth holding-in-reserve’ is the “way in which mortals are to dwell
in language.”204 Firstly, holding-in-reserve means ‘holding-back’ from naïve prejudice
and rash theorizing; it means suspending all judgements and leaving all definitions
pending. Secondly, according Padrutt ‘coming-forth’ fits:
1. …with what is unpretentiously own—unsaid and unthought, unexpected—
to the ‘originary’ in future and in history.
2. …with what is called ‘fore-running’ into the possibility of death in Being
and Time, which—when called by the call of conscience—ensures the
‘disclosedness’ in any given ‘situation’ and is not confused with a rash,
breakneck leap.205
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Thus, this idea of the ‘coming-forth holding-in-reserve’ helps us elucidate the
safeguarding of the fourfold in terms of not exploiting it, letting it be, pausing and
allowing its phenomenal presence to flood the moment with new features previously
foreclosed on because of rashness and hastiness. Padrutt finds this notion to be a fitting
designation for ecological concerns, for what is at issue is a “fundamental comportment
of self-effacement, respect, and joining in with a broader connectedness, on that bears us
up and withdraws itself from our control.”206
The responsible shepherd must bear in mind, however, that human beings still
sustain themselves by transforming the earth through work. Is this at odds with
shepherding the fourfold, and does this outrun machination? Gerry Gill gives an
interesting reading of Heidegger’s 1936 essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In it,
Heidegger clarifies the distinction between ‘earth’ and ‘world.’ Gill departs from
Heidegger’s intent to discuss the ways in which great works of art “bring a specific
historical way of life into being.”207 Instead, the author intends to focus his scope on
concepts relating to the issues related to the concept of ‘landscape.’ For Heidegger, the
world is a familiar realm of human engagement and activity, including the artifacts of
such activity. The world is not to be seen as a composite of present-at-hand objects, but
rather as the summation of the activity of ‘worlding.’ Heidegger writes,
World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of
birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. Wherever
206
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those decisions of our history that relate to our essential being are made, are taken
up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are discovered again by new
enquiry, there the world worlds.208
The world is a ‘place’ where particular ways of being and dwelling, with its possibilities
and limits, comes into being. On the other hand, the earth is that upon which worlds and
worlding can occur. “The earth is that which sustains and shelters. Earth is irreducibly
spontaneous, is effortless and untiring. Upon earth and in it, historical man grounds his
dwelling in the world.”209
The relationship between the two, however, is one of strife. Heidegger writes that
the world, “in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it.”210 Such that the “opposition
of world and earth is strife.”211 Gill notices that many radical environmentalist take from
this the intent to remove the strife in its entirety. Yet, a more realistic alternative must be
fleshed out. Granted, the opposite of technical mastery is caring and letting-be; Gill
notices that this strife is “an inevadable part of the human condition.”212 Recall earlier in
Chapter 1 White’s historical account of agriculture. In utilizing the less harmful scratchplow, agrarian societies nevertheless were transforming the earth through work. In the
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hypothetical golden-age before the fall into so-called humanism and exploitation, there
was still strife of some sort. The word strife is not a bad word, only the destructive kind
of strife is at issue. Furthermore, the problem arises when strife is no longer sustained,
and when equal tension between world and earth is lost. Gill explains:
Rather than contrasting caring for the earth with mastering and manipulating it,
the crucial discrimination is between destructive modes of strife and those which
preserve it and allow it to maintain its health.213
Provided that strife is inevitable and inevadable, it provides a more nuanced and realistic
account of our shepherding role. A generalized, laissez-fare account of caring is too
vague: we must realize that some ‘harm’ will come about in our strife, in our
transforming the earth through work. Is this the same as machination? Not necessarily. So
long as the strife maintains and ‘sustains’ equal tension between world and earth, and so
long as we are circumspect to not level off Being into calculative explainability, then we
outrun machination. In our dealings with non-human objects, we as shepherds must be
careful to ‘sustain’ that healthy strife.
There are also implications in our dealings with non-human animals in our role as
shepherds. As Turner observes, the whole enterprise of Agribusiness has up to now
framed “individual non-human animals as units of potential value from which businesses
seek maximum yield at minimum expense, granting these animals only that meagre care
and maintenance that promotes this economic imperative.”214 Turner shows how
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Heidegger’s philosophy helps counter the justifications for mechanized agribusiness
based on non-human animal’s incapability of self-awareness and rationality. How? By
requiring of us to “encounter the non-human animal in a pre-cognitive openness to the
demand of a needful Other.”215 If in our role as a shepherd we approach non-human
animals without pre-figuring or pre-conceiving, with the kind of openness and reticence
to an “original but neglected sense of mystery when faced with the other animal, which,
like a human, has subjective experience…we will hesitate before issuing proclamations
about their being or calculations of their value.”216 Turner claims that by encountering the
animal other in this way, as a consequence it will require us to cease rendering them up
for consumption.
In a concrete way, how might we shepherd non-human animals? In our three roles
as shepherd (protecting, letting be, allowing to flourish), we might better embody such
roles by the creation and maintenance of wildlife areas; to create conditions in which
non-human animals could live out more authentically with minimal human interference.
Although, Turner notes along with Gill, the role of the shepherd requires more
imagination than just a “generally protective but laissez-faire approach to other
animals.”217 For that the human and non-human animals’ worlds have and always will be
entangled with each other such that it will require of is to examine and come up with new
possibilities for living with them. The modes of thinking Heidegger suggests, along with
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an ‘openness to the mystery’ (Offenheit für das Geheimnis) can provide the solution by
opening up new, un-thought possibilities of dwelling in the world with ourselves and with
non-human animals.
However, this position of shepherding, Turner notes, comes with a caveat. For
the very reason that humans possess a kind of power over the non-human animal’s being
and world, we should be wary of just how we go about our shepherding, because we may
do more harm than good. Humans have the ability to either significantly expand or
contract the worlds of non-human animals. For example, in the case of teaching sign
language to apes, we can expand the world for an ape that was hitherto unavailable. Yet,
as in the case of factory farming, we can significantly contract the world of a chicken by
merely providing it with a living space only the size of a beverage coaster. Regarding
living spaces in zoos, Turner observes, we can house animals in primitive metal cages, or
in caged environments “designed to more closely resemble the animal’s natural
habitat.”218 We run the risk of contracting worlds by the various ways in which we house
animals in zoos and wildlife areas. Additionally, the zoo environment itself and the
purpose of showcasing contracts the scope the non-human animals’ world by delimiting
their purpose as being merely for the sake of human amusement and entertainment.
Therefore, with our role as shepherds, we must take careful measure to not conceive of
ourselves as lords but as guardians, to be circumspect regarding our ability to expand and
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contract worlds, and to “preserve animals’ mystery and to allow natural and authentic
modes of their being to flourish.”219
If there is a practical ground-plan for doing something about our environmental
condition, then it must involve a tremendous amount of circumspection and imagination.
It will require us to be ‘thoughtful,’ and to not seek easy answers which might lead
toward machination. In conclusion, Sharon Harvey provides two practical guides for
environmental problem-solving which are ‘thoughtful’ alternatives taken from
Heidegger’s work. Firstly, to keep meditative thinking alive. How we do so practically
might be to “increase opportunities for artistic/poetic exercise in environmental
awareness.”220 An example of awareness raising by means of art is presented in Stuart
Grant’s article “Performing from Heidegger’s Turning.” The project Coastal Scales—a
collaboration between the EPA and various groups including Indigenous scholars and
environmental scientists— “entails a series of mobile site-specific performances” which
are performed in various geographic locations, including salt marshes, industrial
graveyards, and semi-reconstituted scrubland.221 With the use of performance art, one of
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the project’s intent was to bring awareness to space and place, making known the strife
between earth and world.
Another way to keep meditative thinking alive is to “exchange the predominate
posture of power for voluntary humility.”222 Another might be to actively encourage and
sponsor nature retreats. Perhaps high-ranking officials in the Oil industry might do well
to go snorkeling or deep-sea diving in the Gulf of Mexico with the aid of a trained marine
biologist before deciding to build another offshore drilling rig. A second ‘thoughtful’
alternative Harvey suggests is to limit utilitarian and industrial approaches to nature.
Against machination, this might entail exposing “the drawbacks of cost-benefit analyses
and risk assessment measures in their current forms for environmental problemsolving.”223 Another might be to “develop environmental auditing that includes
meditative thinking.”224 Finally, in order to offset the understanding of science as solely a
quantitative process by permitting “greater receptivity to the qualitative inputs of the
social sciences for providing balanced environmental assessments.”225 We could argue
for a radical heterogeneity in our environmental scientific assessments, preventing only
one mode of scientific inquiry from hogging the microphone, and to promote multiple
modes discoursing. The quantitative-scientific way of encountering is just one way of
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encountering, and we would do well to not totalize and prevent the input of other
disciplines within the social sciences.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

My thesis intersects with multiple areas of concern including environmentalism,
humanism, technology, exploitation, and environmental-problem solving with the aid of
Heidegger’s philosophy. Particularly, my intention was to challenge the kind of
environmentalism which charges humanism, and thereby technology, with being
responsible for our current environmental condition. In the first section, I charted the
“problem” of humanism, the notion that humanism is the root of environmental issues.
Utilizing the insights of Hinchman, an alternative and proper conception of humanism
was presented by locating it within its own historical and civic tradition. The humanism
that the environmentalist attacks is ‘homocentrism.’ Humanism proper is concerned with
those very issues and themes that the environmentalist shares, namely the disenchantment
of nature, technocratic problem solving in political affairs, the worry over the totalizing
power of Galilean physics, and the preservation of the humanities.
In the second section, I presented Heidegger’s critique of humanism. Why? As a
way of reformulating what it means to be human and the word ‘humanism’ so as to
deflect the charges levelled by the environmentalist. Heidegger’s critique does not render
him an anti-humanist, rather it shows him to be more aligned with humanism proper as
presented in section one: the concern of preserving human dignity and the concern over a
totalizing mono-discourse. Homocentrism is Heidegger’s target, but he is friendly
91

towards humanism proper, and ultimately towards environmentalism. In the third section,
I followed along with Heidegger’s thinking in The Question Concerning Technology, in
which we arrive at the origin of the exploitative mood. The origin lies in a way of
revealing granted by Being, yet man is complicit in the revealing. However, neither can
be singled out for moral blame, and to do so is counter-productive.
In the final section, with the aid of various thinkers, I showed how Heidegger’s
thinking challenges environmental problem-solving. It was shown that environmentalists
are victim to what they claim to be against, namely anthropocentrism, Cartesianism,
technicity and machination. I also showed how Heidegger’s philosophy provides for a
better kind of environmentalism that attempts to outrun the shortcomings of modern
environmental problem-solving. How? By promoting new modes of thinking which are
careful, reticent, imaginative, and responsible. However, this other way does not deflate
human significance: humans are an important being in Being’s unfolding, though this
does not result in exploitative anthropocentrism, but in a careful and responsible pastoralcentrism.
What is needed in environmentalism today is precisely the kind of ‘thinking’ that
Heidegger proffers. The technocratic bureaucrat and eco-warrior alike would do well to
pause and reflect on their presuppositions. Perhaps more so for the latter, for having taken
the moral high-ground, they are less likely to reassess their position; they believe and are
adamant that they are the purveyors of environmental wisdom and the univocal voice for
tree and beast.
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